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NOTES
A Full Laundering Cycle is Required: Plowing Back
the Proceeds to Carry On Crime IS the Crime
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)
I. INTRODUcrION
No one can debate that crime is profitable. The international
narcotics industry is the largest growth industry in the world, with
revenues exceeding $500 billion annually. The profits alone draw
interest upwards 'of three million dollars per hour.' To convert
these profits into legally obtained income, the "dirty" proceeds
generated by the multi-billion dollar economy of the narcotics
industry and other lucrative criminal organizations are "washed" to
appear legitimate.2 This process of "washing" illegally obtained
monies is appropriately labeled money laundering. Since money
laundering converts illegal acts into profitable transactions without
any link to the owner of the illegal funds, Congress called money
laundering "the lifeblood of the drug trade and other criminal
organizations."' Congressional sponsors recognized the need to
criminalize money laundering transactions. As Senator Joseph
Biden commented, "[m]oney laundering is a crucial financial
underpinning of organized crime and narcotics trafficking. With-
out [it], drug traffickers would literally drown in cash.... [They]
need money laundering to conceal the billions of dollars in cash
generated annually in drug sales and to convert [their] cash into
manageable form."4
1 J. Mius, THE UNDERGROUND EMPIRE 3 (1986). See also James Cook, The Paradox of
Antidrug Enforcement, FoRBES, Nov. 13, 1989, at 105. The author quotes David Wilson,
chief of the financial operations section of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency,
who ommented on the financial dimensions of the drug trade: "It's like those black
holes the astronomers tell us about. . .. We know it's out there, and we know it is
quite big, but how big is it? It doesn't really emit a whole lot of light, so we don't really
know." Id. at 106. Estimates of the amount of money involved in the drug business are
so tenuous as to be worth little. As the author explains, different government agencies
arrive at different figures. Id.
2 It has been determined that drug dealers and other criminals now launder as
much as $300 billion annually through the nation's financial system. Dean Foust, The
New, Improved Money Launderers, Bus. WK., June 28, 1993, .at 91.
3 S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986).
4 Id. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate
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To drain the monetary incentive out of organized crime and
drug trafficking, Congress first passed statutes proscribing specific
illegal activity, such as narcotics distribution,5 fraud,' and continu-
ing criminal enterprise.7 Congress also imposed statutory reporting
requirements on financial institutions for certain transactions.8
Initially, however, Congress did not prohibit the structuring of
transactions to avoid those filing requirements.9 Although these
efforts did combat the profitable crime industry to some extent,
such approaches did not effectively deter criminals or prevent the
growth of criminal organizations. The cash generated through
narcotics deals and organized crime "businesses" still posed a seri-
ous problem. As stated in the Senate Report, "every dollar laun-
dered means another dollar available to support new supplies of
Committee on the Judiciary, id. at 4. Interestingly, in the period from 1984 to 1986, an
estimated 89% of the $177.4 billion of cash in circulation outside banks was apparently
"held in unreported hoards, 'underground' for illegal purposes, or offshore." Laura M.L.
Maroldy, Note, Recordkeeping and Reporting in an Attempt to Stop the Money Laundering Cycle:
Why Blanket Recording and Reporting of Wire and Electronic Funds Transfers Is Not the Answer,
66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863, 865-66 n.11 (1991) (quoting Changes in the Use of Trans-
actions Accounts and Cash from 1984 to 1986, 73 FED. RES. BULL. 179, 191 (1987)).
Although cash is difficult to trace, criminals desire to launder "dirty money" for a
number of reasons. One author explained:
[I]llegal-source cash can be difficult to handle due to its sheer physical volume,
particularly with large amounts of cash in small denominations. In addition,
criminals need to use their funds without attracting suspicion as to their source.
This is why laundering illegally generated cash is so important to the success of
large-scale criminal enterprises.
Maroldy, id. at 866. See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH
CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONs, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (Oct.
1984). In this interim report, the Commission noted that "the degree of sophistication
and complexity in a laundering scheme is virtually infinite, and is limited only by the
creative imagination and expertise of the criminal entrepreneurs who devise such
schemes." Id. Law enforcement agencies believe that cash from narcotics trafficking com-
prises the lion's share of money laundering. Id.
5 Controlled Substance Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title II, § 401, 84 Stat. 1260
(1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 841 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
6 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 749 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1001 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
7 Controlled Substance Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title II, § 401, 84 Stat. 1260
(1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
8 See Sarah N. Welling, Smufs, Money Laundering and the Federal Criminal Law: The
Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287, 288-89 (1989); see also Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, Title II, 84 Stat. 1118
(1970) (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5324 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter
BSA]. The regulations required financial institutions to file a report for cash transactions
over $10,000. See discussion infra Part II.B.
9 See discussion infra Part II.B.
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cocaine and heroin on the streets of this country."" Since "the
growth of money laundering has been a corollary of the spread of
profitable illegal enterprises,"" Congress finally recognized the
importance of enacting a new federal statute proscribing money
laundering. As part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Congress enacted
the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, and for the first time,
criminalized transactions in which criminals use the proceeds of
their illegal activity. 2 Through this Act, Congress intended to
render the money derived from illegal activities worthless and hit
the criminal "where he bruises, and that is right in the pocket-
book.""5
This Note explores one provision of the Money Laundering
Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). This "Promotion Stat-
ute" criminalizes any financial transaction in which criminals spend
their ill gotten gains "with the intent to promote the carrying on
of specified unlawful activity."' 4 Federal appellate courts have ad-
dressed "promotion" with varying perceptions of congressional
intent. The difficulty has especially manifested itself in cases where
the specified unlawful activity is already completed. 5 This Note
discusses how the federal circuits have construed both section
10 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 4.
11 Id. at 2.
12 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, Title I, Subtitle H,
§§ 1351-67, 100 Stat. 3207-18 & 3207-39 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
1956-57 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
13 H.R. REP. No. 855, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986). In 1991, the Attorney Gener-
al of the United States, Richard Thomburgh, expanded this theory. "The warning motto
we want to brand upon the minds of drug profiteers is 'You make it, we'll take it.' And
if we take away their ugly profits, we can truly help turn the corner in this fight against
international traffickers and their financial minions." Richard Thornburgh, Money Laun-
dering, Address Before the City Club Forum Luncheon, Cleveland, Ohio (May 11, 1990),
in VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, July 15, 1990, at 578, 580.
14 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) (1988). In its entirety, the "Promotion Statute" pro-
vides:
(a) (1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts
to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity-
(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; . ..
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of
the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment
for not more than twenty years, or both.
Id.
15 See discussion infra Parts VA & B.
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1956(a) (1) (A) (i) and the circumstances under which a person
"promotes the carrying on of specified unlawful activity."16 After
articulating the expanded definition of "promotion," this Note
argues that the circuit courts are obscuring congressional intent in
applying the statute. Part II contains a brief history of money
laundering legislation as it examines the relevant doctrinal threads
which foreshadowed its enactment. Part III provides an overview of
congressional intent behind the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986. Part IV examines the structure of the statute and the basic
principles of its relevant terms. Part V analyzes several recent fed-
eral circuit court opinions which have addressed and applied "pro-
motion" under section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). Part VI explores the
consequences and practical repercussions of the current view of
"promotion." This Part suggests that the courts may have expand-
ed this section beyond congressional intent.
Part VII concludes that section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) does not pro-
scribe "promotion" to completed specified unlawful activity as judi-
cially applied. Rather, Congress specifically intended to thwart the
flow of illicit profits back to the criminal enterprise so as to pre-
vent the capitalization and ever-increasing expansion of criminal
activity. Thus, it is incumbent upon the Supreme Court to address
diverse rulings of the circuit courts to establish a uniform standard
of prosecutorial application and judicial oversight.
II. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE MONEY
LAUNDERING CONTROL AcT OF 1986
Prior to the enactment of the Money Laundering Control Act
of 1986, money laundering itself was not a crime. Most of the
focus on money laundering activities, and prosecutions thereof,
involved a combination of conspiracy charges and violations of
currency reporting requirements. 7 This discussion of the doc-
trinal threads of modem money laundering law reveals the basis
of section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and the foundation for its language,
language which Congress deliberately included to formulate con-
sensus money laundering legislation.
16 See supra note 14.
17 See G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering. The Crime of the '90's, 27 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 149, 150 (1989). The author cites the conspiracy provisions of Title 21 and Title 18,
and Title 31 currency transaction reporting ("CTR") violations as the focus of money
laundering provisions. See also United States v. Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1574 (l1th Cir.
1986) (upholding conviction based upon a combination of Title 21, Title 31, and Title 18
conspiracy charges).
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A. Money Laundering as Acts of Conspiracy
The legislative history of the Money Laundering Control Act
reveals that Congress derived some of the statute's language from
both conspiracy law and aiding and abetting prosecutions. Specifi-
cally, the "intent to promote the carrying on" language of section
1956(a)(1) is intended to encompass situations "like those prose-
cuted under the aiding and abetting statute in which a defendant
knowingly furnishes substantial assistance to a person whom he or
she is aware will use that assistance to commit a crime."18 An un-
derstanding of the basis for section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) terminology
is a helpful tool for delineating its scope.
Case law developed in the 1940s which permitted prosecutions
for "aiding and abetting" or "conspiring to aid and abet" criminals
in their illegal ventures by providing otherwise legitimate goods
and services. Specifically, professionals and businessmen were tar-
gets of this conspiracy prosecution. 9 These participants in illegal
ventures were prosecuted if, through their goods and services, they
"facilitated the illegal objectives of the conspiracy," and "provided
the services with an intent to facilitate the illicit objectives of the
enterprise."" Mere knowledge of the intended illegal use of their
products was not enough. As Judge Learned Hand explained, " [i] t
is not enough that a [businessman] does not forego a normally
lawful activity, of the fruits of which he knows that others make an
unlawful use; he must in some sense promote their venture him-
self, make it his own, have a stake in the outcome.... 21 Knowl-
18 S. RFP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 10. The "aiding and abetting statute" states:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, coun-
sels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as
a principal.
Ch. 321, § 332, 35 Stat. 1152 (1909) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)).
19 Strafer, supra note 17, at 150. Professionals and businessmen provided such goods
and services to the criminals; thus, they were an easy target as "aiders and abettors." Id.
20 Id. The prosecution had to prove each of these conditions for a successful convic-
tion.
- 21 United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.), afd 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
In this case, the Second Circuit held merchants not guilty of aiding and abetting when
they sold large quantities of sugar to bootleggers even though the merchants acted with
knowledge that illegal use was made of their product. Judge Hand differentiated the
mere knowledge and moral obligation to refrain from selling goods from the act of phys-
ically participating in the venture: "We may agree that morally the defendants at bar
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edge was a prerequisite to a criminal violation, but intent to pro-
mote and identify with the criminal venture ensured a convic-
tion."
The next expansion of conspiracy law occurred in the latter
part of the 1970s when the government applied the concept to
narcotics-related money laundering. Typically, the defendants who
participated in the narcotics ring of the conspiracy were also
"washing" the money derived from such activity and promoting the
conspiracy by purchasing more drugs." This link between the
defendant who "washed" money and the underlying drug trans-
action persisted as a necessary requirement to convict the defen-
dant under conspiracy laws.24 Money laundering was not itself a
crime until 1986 when Congress realized that those who merely
"wash" the money of illegal activity do promote and participate in
the underlying criminal activity, even in the absence of a more
direct link to the proscribed crime.'
should have refused to sell to illicit distillers; but, both morally and legally, to do so was
totally different from joining with them in running the stills." Id. at 581. See also Strafer,
supra note 17, at 151.
22 See, e.g., Direct Sales v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 713 (1943). Here, the defen-
dant, a registered drug manufacturer and wholesaler, sold large quantities of morphine
sulfate to a doctor who subsequently dispensed vast quantities of the drug to and
through drug addicts. Because of the defendant's willingness to distribute large quantities
to a private physician, the doctor continually increased his order. The court recognized
that although knowledge and intent to engage in a conspiracy to violate narcotics laws
are not the same, intent can be inferred from the act of providing goods of an inher-
ently unlawful or highly regulated kind. The court held that "there is more than suspi-
cion, more than knowledge, acquiescence, carelessness, indifference . . . . There is in-
formed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation." Id.
23 See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979). In this case, the defen-
dants not only washed the money but personally bought and delivered large quantities of
drugs. Id. at 132. Money laundering was not the crime, but was merely used to show
knowledge and participation enough to promote illegal activity. The court held that mon-
ey launderers who were also participants in the narcotics ring were part of a "chain con-
spiracy" and were prosecuted as conspirators, not as money launderers. Id. at 155.
24 Strafer, supra note 17, at 154. See also United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d
1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that since money laundering is itself not a crime,
the government must show a sufficient link between "a defendant's money laundering
and the underlying drug transaction to demonstrate that defendant was a member of a
conspiracy").
25 See Unites States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
907 (1984). This case was the first to introduce the concept that a money laundering
service involving currency deposits and check and wire transfers operated as a means by
which to further the conspiracy. The defendants were convicted as part of a chain con-
spiracy; they washed the dirty drug money. The new statute, the Money Laundering Con-
trol Act of 1986, which proscribed the specific crime of money laundering, was enacted
two years later.
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Although Congress eliminated its complete reliance on con-
spiracy laws to prosecute money launderers, the analysis by Judge
Learned Hand and the legal arguments of those who prosecuted
under the conspiracy doctrine are embodied in the Money Laun-
dering Control Act of 1986. Thus, the "promotion" of the unlaw-
ful activity, which was critical to a conviction involving money
laundering in 1940, is now codified as a necessary element of
section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i).
B. The Bank Secrecy Acd 6
Prior to 1986, many of the crimes which were described as
"money laundering" were violations of currency reporting require-
ments. The reporting requirements were part of the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970 (BSA) in which Congress attempted to combat the
common practice of moving illegal profits into bank accounts and
"borrowing" the money back through fictitious loans.17 This meth-
od not only laundered income, but also provided a benefit to the
launderer from income tax deductions claimed as "interest" on the
fictitious loan.28 The BSA required financial institutions to file a
Currency Transaction Report relative to each cash transaction of
$10,000 or more.' The failure to report such transactions con-
stituted a violation of the BSA."
Significant loopholes in the BSA forced Congress to reexam-
ine money laundering as a crime in itself. Before 1986, the re-
porting regulations included no provision expressly prohibiting
structured transactions-deposits of less than $10,000 with differ-
ent banks or at different branches of the same bank. In one day,
the large sum of cash was converted easily into more portable, less
suspicious instruments, and the launderer successfully evaded the
26 BSA, supra note 8.
27 Patrick T. O'Brien, Tracking Narco-Dollars: The Evolution of a Potent Weapon in the
Drug War, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AMERL L. REV. 637, 640 (1990).
28 Id.
29 See Emily J. Lawrence, Note, Let the Seller Beware: Money Laundering, Merchants and
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957, 33 B.C. L. REV. 841, 843 (1992).
30 Financial institutions have incentive to comply with the reporting requirements.
The civil penalty for one violation is the greater of $100,000 or the amount involved in
the transaction. The criminal penalty for a violation of the Treasury's regulations carries
a fine of $250,000 and/or five years' imprisonment. 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (1988 & Supp. V
1993); 31 C.F.R. § 103.47 (1990). See Maroldy, supra note 4, at 879-80. These penalties
are enhanced if the government proves a "pattern of illegal activity." 31 U.S.C. § 5322
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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reporting requirements." "Smurfs" structured the transactions for
those who wished to launder money but did not want the transac-
tion to be reported for fear that the filing would draw the atten-
tion of revenue or law enforcement agents. 2 Circuit courts over-
turned convictions of defendants who structured their transactions,
since the BSA did not give fair warning to defendants that struc-
turing transactions was illegal." As a result, this approach to pros-
ecuting money laundering proved ineffective in deterring criminals
from laundering money through financial institutions.
Though Congress enacted an anti-structuring provision in
1986 to fill the wide gap in the BSA, 4 its pre-1986 loopholes
weakened its effectiveness in the battle against money laundering
and provided an additional impetus for Congress to proscribe
money laundering as a crime in itself. Before 1986, the type of
transactions criminalized under the BSA was extremely limited and
failed to cut off the "lifeblood" of the crime industry or "hit crimi-
31 Maroldy, supra note 4, at 881. See Welling, supra note 8, at 296-97.
32 See Lawrence, supra note 29, at 843; Welling, supra note 8, at 297 (those who en-
gaged in such transactions were "smurfs" because they were everywhere, just like the
cartoon characters of the 1980s).
33 See United States v. Mastronardo, 849 F.2d 799, 804 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding no
provision in the law which makes it illegal to structure transactions); United States v.
Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986) (structuring by an individual is not prohibited
by the statute); United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 681 (1st Cir. 1985) (nothing in
the law suggests that an individual structured transaction is illegal). But see United States
v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220 (1986) (structured
transactions held illegal).
34 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This statute makes it illegal to
"structure" a transaction for the purpose of evading the reporting requirement. In addi-
tion, 31 U.S.C. § 5322 sets out criminal penalties for a person "willfully violating" the
anti-structuring provision. See, Welling, supra note 8, at 304.
For a more recent treatment of the scienter required for a "willful" violation of the
anti-structuring provision, see Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994) (holding that
to give effect to section 5322(a)'s "willfulness" requirement, the Government must prove
that the defendant acted with knowledge that the structuring undertaken by the defen-
dant was unlawful, not simply that the defendant's purpose was to circumvent the bank's
currency reporting obligation).
Although these anti-structuring provisions were enacted in 1986, enforcement of this
law has also proven difficult for the government which receives over 7 million currency
reports from banks each year. Jonathan Beaty, A Torrent of Dirty Dollars, TIME, Dec. 18,
1989, at 50-53. Additionally, reports on millions of legitimate transactions each year are
beginning to overwhelm the government's ability to trace the trail of illicit funds. Money
launderers have also discovered other ways to evade the government's surveillance system.
For example, launderers turn to certain nonbank providers of financial services, such as
Western Union, which cash checks for the launderers. Although these nonbank providers
are supposed to file currency reports as well, these businesses are rarely checked by gov-
ernmental authorities to make certain they are complying with the reporting require-
ments. Foust, supra note 2, at 91.
[Vol. 70:4
NOTE-MONEY LAUNDERING
nals right where they bruise: in the pocketbook." 5 In response,
Congress fashioned new approaches which do not specifically pro-
scribe the criminal's activity. Rather, these new approaches deny
criminals the profitable fruits of their illegal activities by
criminalizing the financial transactions conducted with the illicit
proceeds.
III. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Although this Note targets one provision of the Money Laun-
dering Control Act of 1986, it is necessary to obtain a compre-
hensive understanding of the congressional intent behind the Act
as a whole. As described in Part II, the crime of money launder-
ing has evolved from the concept of the underlying activity as the
sole illegal act, through the approach requiring financial institu-
tions to report certain transactions in order to alert enforcement
officials to possible illegal proceeds, to the current view that mon-
ey laundering is itself a serious act and a distinct crime.
As the legislative history reveals, Congress established an inde-
pendent federal offense to eliminate the laundering of money
gained from illegal activity."s Congress intended this offense to
provide the government with greater enforcement tools to inves-
tigate criminal organizations who survive on the "lifeblood" of
professional money launderers." Since money laundering is a
"crucial financial underpinning of organized crime and narcotics
trafficking, " ' Congress also desired a tool which authorized the
government to seek forfeiture of assets and profits of money laun-
derers 9 and promoted stiffer penalties in an effort to deter those
35 H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 13, at 13; infia p. 904 & note 42.
36 S. REP. NO. 433, supra note 3, at 1.
37 Id. See also Foust, supra note 2, at 91. Government agents claim that while they
cannot stop the flood of illicit cash, they have made life difficult for launderers. Id.
38 Senator Joseph Biden, the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 4.
39 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-82 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). These statutes provide for the
civil and criminal forfeitures relating to but not necessarily involving money laundering.
Specifically, they authorize the civil forfeiture of any real or personal property that repre-
sents the gross receipts obtained, directly or indirectly, through a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1956 and § 1957 or is traceable to either of these statutes. § 981(a) (1) (A). The statutes
further proscribe forfeiture for any proceeds of a violation of the drug laws; that viola-
tion also amounts to a U.S. felony. § 981(a) (1) (B). Finally, any coin or currency is sub-
ject to forfeiture if it is involved in a transaction violating the currency reporting require-
ments or the anti-structuring statute. § 981(a) (1) (C). See also Peter J. Kacarab, An Indepth
Analysis of the New Money Laundering Statutes, 8 AKRON TAX J. 1, 2-3 n.4 (1991).
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who engage in money laundering.' Thus, Congress wanted a
powerful tool not only to close the loopholes of the BSA, but to
transform money laundering suspects into "commercial pariahs"
that bankers, businessmen, and other individuals would shun. t
The statute also applies to persons who assist the criminal in
promoting the illegal activity if, in exchange for goods and servic-
es, they accept money known to be the proceeds derived from
illegal activity. As one Congressional sponsor of the Money Laun-
dering Control Act stated:
The only way we will get at this problem is to let the whole
community, the whole population, know that they are part of
the problem and they could very well be convicted of it if they
knowingly take these funds. If we can make a drug dealers
money worthless, then we have really struck a chord, and we
have hit him where he bruises, and that is right in the pocket-
book.42
As a result, Congress structured the statute to apply to all those
who engage in a financial transaction with the requisite knowledge
that the proceeds involved were derived from illicit profits." This
expansive reach of the statute is intended to curb the flow of illic-
it profits back to the unlawful enterprises that created such pro-
ceeds. Thus, this process is designed to prevent the capitalization
and expansion of criminal activity and to deflate the criminal's
motivation for laundering money by targeting the criminal's
"Achilles heel"-the need to have the money earned from the
illegal activity marketable in the community.44
40 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. The penalties for a violation of the
statute are clearly defined: Whoever is in violation of the statute "shall be sentenced to a
fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the trans-
action, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years or both." §
1956(a)(1). Thus, the statute intends "to authorize forfeiture of the profits earned by
launderers . . . and to enhance the penalties under existing law in order to further
deter the growth of money laundering." S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 1.
41 Strafer, supra note 17, at 171.
42 H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 13, at 13.
43 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)-(3); 1957(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). All of these sections
begin with "whoever." See supra note 14 for the full text of § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i); see also S.
REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 9-15.
44 See Kacarab, supra note 39, at 1; see also Mark J. Kadish, 36 EMORY L.J. 793
(1987). Some commentators have suggested that this expansive reach of the statute has
significantly diluted the attorney-client privilege. If attorneys represent clients whose finan-
cial resources are of possible suspicious origin, § 1956 can subject those attorneys to
criminal and civil penalties. The attorney does not have to share the client's intent to
promote specified unlawful activity or conceal the source, or origin of the proceeds. It is
sufficient to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the attorney was aware of
[Vol. 70:4
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Finally, Congress intended the money laundering statute to be
a separate crime distinct from the underlying offense that generat-
ed the money to be laundered.45 Throughout the Senate Report,
Congress manifested a desire to fill the gap in criminal law in the
area of post-crime hiding of the ill-gotten gains of specified unlaw-
ful activity.46 In essence, Congress did not intend for this law to
be a "tag-along charge" to the substantive charge." The statute
does not require the government to prove the defendant's partici-
pation in the substantive underlying activity. In fact, it is increas-
ingly difficult for the government to bring substantive charges
against such defendants since many of them are skilled at insulat-
ing themselves from such proscribed illegal activity. Money laun-
dering has its greatest impact in this area. 8 Congress is not offer-
ing an alternative means to prosecute the prior specified unlawful
activity; rather, the underlying crime and the money laundering
are separate crimes which are punished separately.49
The legislative intent of the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986 has been reviewed by several federal courts. In United States
v. Edgmon,-° the Tenth Circuit tracked the legislative intent of the
money laundering statute amid challenges by the defendant that a
conviction for conversion and a separate conviction for money
laundering violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Co-defendant, Jimmy W. Edgmon, Sr., participated in
a scheme to defraud the Farmers' Home Administration (FmHA)
by selling cattle which served as collateral for the loan FmHA
the client's design or purpose. This dilution perhaps threatens the basic attorney/client
confidentiality, "chills the adversarial nature of formal proceedings, and denies the client
full and fair representation." Id. at 795-97.
45 See S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 4 (stressing the "importance of enacting a
new Federal offense against money laundering); United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479, 485
(4th Cir. 1994) (noting that "Congress intended the statute to aim directly at the activity
of laundering the money gained from illegal activity"); United States v. Edgmon, 952
F.2d 1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that Congress intended the statute to be a
separate crime distinct from the underlying offense).
46 See S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 1-4; Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1213 (stating that
"Congress intended simply to add a new criminal offense to punish activity that was not
previously punished criminally").
47 See Kacarab, supra note 39, at 18. The author notes that "Congress' intent...
was to provide an indirect means for the government to investigate such criminal activity
and organizations by criminalizing certain transactions conducted with the proceeds of
illegal activities." Id.
48 Id. at 71.
49 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 1-9.
50 952 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1991).
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issued to his son. He used the proceeds from the conversion to
purchase more land and a new tractor,5' and subsequently used
the equity in the land and the tractor to obtain a loan from a
local bank. Edgmon, Sr. was convicted of money laundering under
1956(a) (1)(B)(i),52 conversion of FmHA collateral, and conspiring
to convert.5 On appeal, the court found the evidence sufficient
to support a finding under section 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) that Edgmon,
Sr. intended to conceal the origin or nature of the proceeds of
his unlawful activity, the conversion.'
The court rejected the defendant's challenge that a conviction
for both conversion and money laundering violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause.5 Specifically, he asserted that his convictions
constituted multiple punishments for the same offense. 6 Al-
though the crime of conversion is an element of money launder-
ing,57 the court looked to legislative intent to determine if Con-
gress intended the statutory violations to be separate punishable
offenses.58 As the Edgmon court explained, "Congress appears to
51 Id. at 1208-10. Gary A. Edgmon, the son, was also convicted of four counts of
conversion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 658 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and one count of
conspiracy to convert in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
52 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988). In its entirety, this statute provides:
(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts
to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity-
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the own-
ership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . .
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of
the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment
for not more than twenty years, or both.
Id. This statute has been called the "Concealment Statute" to differentiate it from §
1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the "Promotion Statute."
53 Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1208.
54 Id. at 1211.
55 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "[Nior shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
56 Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1212.
57 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Edgmon, Sr. argued that
the Blockburger test is the appropriate test to determine Double Jeopardy Violations. Un-
der this test, the inquiry is whether each statutory provision defining the crimes requires
proof of a fact or element that the other does not. Id. at 304. The crime of conversion
and money laundering does not require proof of different facts. Thus, they do not sur-
vive the Blockburger test. However, the court noted that Blockburger is not dispositive; it is
only one method of determining a Double Jeopardy violation.
58 Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1213. In, Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985), the
Supreme Court addressed the challenge that Double Jeopardy barred prosecution for a
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have intended the money laundering statute to be a separate
crime distinct from the underlying offense that generated the
money to be laundered." 9 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that Con-
gress intended to add an entirely new criminal offense to punish
activity that had not been formerly proscribed and punished crimi-
nally. The statute proscribes conduct that "follows in time the un-
derlying offense" and provided punishment "in addition to other
punishment" rather than replacing one form for another.' The
court drew an analogy to the offense of a continuing criminal
enterprise and its predicate offenses, concluding that money laun-
dering and specified unlawful activity are "separate offenses sepa-
rately punishable.""' Therefore, prosecution and punishment for
both money laundering and its predicate offense, conversion of
collateral, do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.62
More recently, the Second Circuit revisited congressional in-
tent and concurred with the Tenth Circuit. In United States v.
Holmes," the court rejected the defendant's contention that Con-
gress did not intend to impose multiple punishments for embez-
zlement and money laundering since the embezzled funds were
also the subject of the laundering and structuring violations.'
The defendants, Clyde Holmes and Salvatore Frasca, embezzled
several hundred thousand dollars from the United Services Em-
ployees Union Local 377. Specifically, they embezzled the money
from the union's benefit program through two fraudulent schemes
which processed fictitious medical claims in the names of union
continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), and an importation of marijuana offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952,
960 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Garret4 471 U.S. at 773-74. The Court used a
two-step analysis. Where the same conduct violates two statutory provisions, "the first step
in the analysis is to determine whether the legislature . . . intended that each violation
be a separate offense . . . and whether one violation was intended to be a lesser includ-
ed offense of the other." Id. at 779. If Congress intended the statutory violations to be
separately punishable violations, the second step of the analysis determines "whether sepa-
rate prosecutions or punishments for the offenses violates the Due Process Clause." Id. at
786. Garrett indicated that the Blockburger test is not controlling when the legislative intent
is clear from the face of the statute or its legislative history. The iourt held that the
legislative history and statutory framework of the CCE statute clearly indicated that "Con-
gress intended it to be a separate and supplemental offense, in addition to, rather than
instead of, the predicate offenses." Id. at 784-86.
59 Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1213.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1213-14.
62 Id. at 1214-15.
63 Nos. 93-1873, 93-1893, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1280 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 1995).
64 Id. at *7-8.
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members without the members' knowledge or consent.65 Holmes
was convicted of conspiring to embezzle union funds in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 664, embezzlement of union funds in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 664, money laundering by concealing
embezzled funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i), and
money laundering by structuring financial transactions in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (B) (ii).'
On appeal, the defendants asserted that their indictment was
multiplicitous since the embezzlement, money laundering and
structuring were all based upon a single scheme which amounted
to a single, continuous offense.' In response, the Holmes court
reiterated the conclusion in Edgmon: "Congress clearly signaled its
intent to treat the money laundering and structuring as an offense
separate from the underlying criminal conduct that generated or
structured funds. It also intended to impose separate punishments
for these offenses. "' a Therefore, the court concluded that the
crime of embezzlement and the crimes of money laundering by
structuring and concealing financial transactions are "separate
offenses and not part of one continuous offense."69
Like Edgmon, the Second Circuit interpreted the intent and
purpose of section 1956 as creating an entirely separate criminal
offense which directly targets certain types of transactions used to
"wash" the funds from unlawful activity. As a result, section 1956
provides an additional punishment, and in the process, brandishes
an effective weapon against the organized criminal groups which
"reap profits from unlawful activity by camouflaging the proceeds
through elaborate laundering schemes."" Since embezzlement
and money laundering are separate offenses separately punishable,
the Holmes court affirmed both convictions and used Congress's
65 Id. at *2.
66 Id. Holmes was also charged and convicted of witness tampering in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), filing false Internal Revenue Service documents in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1027, and other violations of the Internal, Revenue Code. His co-defendant,
Frasca, was charged and convicted of the same crimes except for the money laundering
violations.
67 Id. at *56.
68 Id. at *8.
69 Id. at *7. The court explained: "One may embezzle union funds without launder-
ing the money or structuring financial 'transactions with it; one may also structure cash
transactions or launder money without having acquired the funds through embezzlement."
Id.
70 Id. at *9 (quoting S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 9).
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weapon appropriately to sentence the defendants for each of-
fense.1
Thus, Congress created a new federal offense which not only
is distinct from its underlying specified unlawful activity, but ap-
plies broadly to those who come in contact with the money laun-
derer and, with knowledge of the illegal source of the proceeds,
take the dirty money so as to effectively conceal the source of the
funds. Formulated with the historical underpinnings of conspiracy
law and the efforts to remedy the BSA in mind, section 1956 has
become a powerful tool for the government to prosecute those
already involved in money laundering and to deter those enticed
by the large profits of the drug trade and other lucrative criminal
organizations. Congress has, in effect, removed the incentive to
engage in money laundering.
IV. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
To interpret section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i), the starting point is the
language of the statute itself. The first canon of statutory construc-
tion is that "a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there."' It is essential, therefore,
to address the language of the statute to understand how the
courts apply section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) to different factual scenari-
os.73 To prosecute under section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i), the govern-
ment must prove five different elements of the substantive money
laundering charge. There are essentially four core elements of
section 1956(a)(1).' In addition, there are four alternative choic-
es which, when chosen by the government to fit the facts of the"
case, comprise the fifth element necessary to satisfy the criteria for
a successful prosecution under section 1956(a) (1).'
71 The court did find merit, however, in the defendant's argument that the money
laundering and the structuring violation constituted one offense in a single financial
transaction. The defendant deposited the money to avoid structuring requirements and
also knew that he was concealing the proceeds of the embezzlement in violation of §
1956(a)(1) (B)(i). The court concluded that Congress intended only a single punishment
for each transaction even though the defendant had "two improper purposes in mind."
Holmes, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1280, at *13.
72 United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 676 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
73 For a discussion of the different ways in which courts apply this section, see infra
Parts V-VI.
74 See supra note 14. The four core elements are: knowledge, conducts or attempts
to conduct a financial transaction, financial transaction, and proceeds in fact from speci-
fied unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (1988).
75 The four additional choices for the fifth element of proof are §§
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A. Four Core Elements of Section 1956(a)(1)
1. Knowledge
The first element is established by the statute's prefatory
phrase: "[W]hoever, knowing that the property involved represents
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. .. ." Congress
concluded, after debating the issue at length, that the standard of
knowledge in this context is one of scienter rather than a "reason
to know" or "reckless disregard" standard.76 However, this ele-
ment does include actions of "willful blindness."77 The Senate
Report reveals that the government must meet a two-part test to
prove scienter: The government must prove not only that "the
defendant knew the property involved in a transaction was the
proceeds of a crime but also that the defendant intended to facil-
itate a crime or knew that the transaction [was] designed to con-
1956(a) (1) (A) (i) & (ii); (11)(i) & (ii):
(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activi-
ty; or
(ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section
7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the own-
ership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity;, or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal
Law...
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (1988).
76 The term "scienter" is "used in pleading to signify an allegation . . . setting out
the defendant's previous knowledge of the cause which led to the injury complained of,
or rather his previous knowledge of a state of facts which it was his duty to guard
against . . . . The term is frequently used to signify the defendant's guilty knowledge."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1345 (6th ed. 1990).
77 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 9-10. See Kacarab, supra note 39, at 5-6. Willful
blindness, under certain circumstances, can substitute for provable actual knowledge on
the part of the accused in a case involving money laundering. U.S. Wins Major Court
Victory on "Willful Blindness," MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT Dec. 1992, at 1.
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ceal the proceeds of a crime."' Mere speculation about the na-
ture and purpose of the transaction is not enough. 9
The Fourth Circuit squarely addressed the knowledge require-
ment and tested its parameters in a case involving the sale of a
home in North Carolina. Although the case involved a prosecution
under section 1956(a) (1) (B) (i), the standard by which the Fourth
Circuit determined the defendant knew the proceeds represented
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity is equally applica-
ble to section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). In United States v. Campbel 80 the
court reversed the judgment of acquittal of a realtor who engaged
in money laundering when she included unreported cash in the
sale of a home to a drug dealer, Mark Lawing. 1 Lawing drove
78 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 9-10. The Senate Report explained by way of an
example:
[A] currency exchanger who participates in a transaction with a known drug
dealer involving hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash and accepts a commis-
sion far above the market rate, could not escape conviction, from the first tier
of the offense, simply by claiming that he did not know for sure that the cur-
rency involved ... was derived from the crime. On the other hand, an auto-
mobile car dealer who sells a car at market rates to a person whom he merely
suspects of involvement with crime, cannot be convicted of this offense in the
absence of a showing that he knew something more about the transaction or
the circumstances surrounding it.
Id. at 10. See also H.R. Rat. No. 855, supra note 13, at 13-14. The House Judiciary Com-
mittee offered its understanding through an example of a grocer. If the grocer had
knowledge that a customer was buying groceries with proceeds of illegal activity because
the grocer knew the customer had no other source of income, the grocer is accountable
just as if he had seen the customer on the street selling drugs before the customer
walked into the store. Id. But, can the grocer be charged with promotion simply because
he sells food that enables a person to sustain herself so as to carry on with her life,
including unlawful activity? Under United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991),
much like a promotion prosecution concerning funds used to maintain a lifestyle, a pro-
motion prosecution of the grocer should not succeed. See infra notes 127-41 and accom-
panying text. But see note 141.
79 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 10.
80 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992). The United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina set aside the jury's verdict convicting a real estate agent of §
1956 and § 1957 money laundering. The district court stated, "in a prosecution against a
party other than the drug dealer," the Government must show "a purpose of conceal-
ment" and "knowledge of the drug dealer's activities." United States v. Campbell, 777 F.
Supp. 1259, 1265 (W.D.N.C. 1991). For a complete analysis of the district court's opin-
ion, see Lawrence, supra note 29, at 859-61.
81 The realtor, Ellen Campbell, was indicted under § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i). See supra
note 52 for the full text of § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i). The scienter is different than §
1956(a)(1) (A)(i) (defendant must intend to promote the carrying on of specified unlaw-
ful activity). Yet both sections contain an initial requirement that the defendant knew the
proceeds represented, the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. Because this case
was brought under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the court analyzed the knowledge requirement in
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flashy cars and lived a carefree life, yet could not obtain a mort-
gage because of his poor credit rating.82 The realtor accepted the
balance of the purchase price, $60,000, "under the table" in cash
and failed to include that portion in the closing statement.83 She
also received a "tip" of a "couple of hundred dollars" for her
services.8 4 Although she did not know the true occupation of
Lawing, the court determined that the "knowledge component"
does not require knowledge of the drug dealer's activities; rather,
the component boils down to this inquiry: "Did she know that
[the purchaser's] funds were derived from an illegal source and
that the transaction was designed to conceal the proceeds?"" If
she deliberately closed her eyes to what should have been obvious,
she is deemed to have the requisite knowledge to satisfy this ele-
ment of the statute. 8 This doctrine of "willful blindness" softens
the actual subjective knowledge component of the statute and
extends the statute's application. Thus, the Fourth Circuit used
the expansive reach of the statute to ultimately send a warning
signal to those who would otherwise "close their eyes" and engage
in profitable transactions with criminals.
In crafting section 1956, Congress included a definitional
section, section 1956(c), to provide a clear understanding of all of
its relevant terms. Section 1956(c) (1) requires only that the gov-
ernment show that the defendant had knowledge that the pro-
ceeds were involved in some form of illegal activity; it does not
require the government to prove knowledge of the specific illegal
terms of that section. However, the Fourth Circuit fashioned a standard by which to
determine this initial knowledge required by both § 1956 (a) (1) (A) (i) and (a) (1) (B) (i).
82 When meeting with Campbell, Mark Lawing, the drug dealer, would travel in a
red Porsche he owned or in a friend's Porsche. He would bring his cellular phone, and
at one time, he carried a briefcase filled with $20,000 in cash to prove his ability to pay
for the house. However, he was unable to secure a loan and asked the owners to accept
$60,000 under the table and to lower the contract price for the house. All agreed. Camp-
bell, 977 F.2d at 855.
83 Id. The closing documents reflected a sales price which excluded the $60,000
entirely.
84 Id. at 856.
85 Id. at 857-58. The court stated that, in this case, "the fraudulent nature of the
transaction itself provides a sufficient basis from which a jury could infer Campbell's
knowledge of the transaction's purpose, if. . ._Campbell also knew of the illegal source
of Lawing's money." Id. at 858.
86 Id. at 859.
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activity in question. 7 The activity, however, must constitute a felo-
ny under state or federal law.s'
2. Conducts or Attempts to Conduct a Transaction
Section 1956(c) (2) defines "conducts or attempts to conduct"
to include "initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating, or
concluding a transaction."89 As such, Congress intended the stat-
ute to reach participants, other than the principal criminals, who
engage in a financial transaction with the knowledge that the
transaction involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.
This section also supports prosecutions of those who never laun-
dered any money for the principal criminal but agreed to launder
illegal proceeds through a legitimate business." The "attempte
language of the statute, therefore, targets those with an intent to
launder regardless of whether or not the design" was actually im-
plemented.
3. Financial Transaction
Although section 1956 provides guidance with respect to the
definition of "financial transaction," courts have consistently grap-
pled with its application to different facts. Perhaps the confusion
arises as a result of the breadth of the definition which construes
"financial transaction." Initially, section 1956(c) (3) defines
"transaction" to include all manners of dealing which encompass
such occurrences as "purchase, sale, loan, gift," and also includes
those transactions related to a financial institution, i.e. deposits,
87 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This subsection states the term
"knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity" means that the "person knew the property involved in
the transaction represented proceeds of some form, though not necessarily which form, of
activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or foreign law" as defined by sub-
section (c)(7). See S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 9-10; Kacarab, supra note 39, at 7.
88 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
89 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
90 Kacarab, supra note 39, at 8. The author gives an example of this inchoate of-
fense. Suppose the government, through an undercover operation, obtains evidence that
a jeweler or other businessman has agreed with a drug dealer to launder drug profits
through his business. Even if the actual laundering of drug profits never occurs because
the drug dealer was arrested or the operation was shut down by sufficient evidence to
prosecute the dealer and others for drug violations and money laundering, the jeweler or
business may be charged under the "attempt" language regardless of whether money was
ever laundered.
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withdrawals, or transfer of money between accounts." Then, sec-
tion 1956(c)(4) describes "financial transaction:
(A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate
or foreign commerce (i) involving the movement of funds by
wire or other means or (ii) involving one or more monetary
instruments, or (iii) involving the transfer of title to any real
property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, or (B) a transaction involv-
ing the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in
any way or degree ... "
Thus, "financial transaction" is not limited by section 1956 to
encompass only those activities conducted in conjunction with a
financial institution; rather, it includes almost every imaginable
type of commercial activity, as long as it affects interstate or for-
eign commerce in some way.9
Additionally, section 1956(c) (5) defines "monetary instru-
ments" to include any type of coin or currency as well as other
forms of negotiable instruments, including personal or traveler's
checks and investment securities.' "Financial institutions" run the
gamut from federally insured banks to single individuals.95
In United States v. Puig-nfante, the Fifth Circuit addressed
the application of the term "financial transaction." The court re-
versed the conviction of Abigail Puig for money laundering under
section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) since her mere transportation of the
proceeds of marijuana sales from Florida to Texas did not consti-
tute a financial transaction within the statute.97 Puig had initially
91 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a more detailed list of trans-
actions, see the text of the statute.
92 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
93 Id. See S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 13; Kacarab, supra note 39, at 10. But see
United States v. Bell, 936 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1991), wherein the Seventh Circuit conclud-
ed that placing money in a safe deposit box did not constitute a transaction within the
meaning of § 1956(a)(1). The court analogized the use of the safety box to the use of a
locker at an airport terminal, noting that the individual retains control over the contents
in each situation. Congress intended to include those activities where the bank actually
retains control over the money, makes a record of it, and perhaps pays interest on it.
94 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(5) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
95 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 13. Under, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(6), "financial
institution" has the definition "given that term in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) which interprets the term broadly. The broad definition is designed to encom-
pass professional money launderers as well. For a list of such financial institutions, see 31
U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(A)-(Y) (1988). See also Kacarab, supra note 39, at 8-9.
96 19 F.3d 929 (5th Cir. 1994).
97 The defendant was involved in a conspiracy to supply marijuana to the United
States from Mexico. This conspiracy began in 1986 and developed a "standard operating
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driven from Laredo, Texas to San Antonio, Texas where she re-
ceived a load of marijuana; she subsequently sold this marijuana
in Florida." She and a co-defendant, Gloria Valles, then returned
to Laredo with the money from the sale.99 As the court stated,
"there was no evidence of what, if anything, happened to the
money thereafter.""°
The court reviewed section 1956(c)(3) and concluded that a
financial transaction not involving a financial institution must
effect a disposition of the proceeds of the activity. As the court ex-
plained, "the statute makes plain that for something (not involving
a financial institution or its facilities) to be a transaction, it must
be a "disposition."10' Disposition most commonly means "'a plac-
ing elsewhere, a giving over to the care or possession of anoth-
er.'"'1 2 Since there was no evidence that the defendant did any-
thing further with the money once she transferred it from Florida
to Texas, the court reversed her conviction for money laundering
under section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i): "Without such proof, her mere
transportation of the proceeds of unlawful activity is not a transac-
tion within the statute." °3 Thus, the statute's application is limit-
ed to factual situations which are consistent with both the lan-
guage of the statute and the underlying congressional intent.'
procedure" in which the defendant participated by making a marijuana run to Florida in
1989. In addition to money laundering, the defendant was convicted of other crimes,
including conspiracy to import in excess of $1,000 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 963, 952(a), and 960(a)(1). The district court sentenced the defendant to
concurrent sentences totally 292 months, followed by 10 years' supervised release. Id. at
934.
98 Id. at 937.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 938.
102 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIoNARY, "654 (1961)).
103 Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d at 938. Although the court did not find a financial transac-
tion based on mere transportation of the proceeds of illegal activity, it can be argued
that Puig participated in a financial transaction when she actually sold the marijuana for
profit in Florida. The valuable portion of this opinion is its treatment of the definition
of "financial transaction" under § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). However, the court applied its own
analysis rather tenuously to the facts in this case. The facts do suggest that Puig engaged
in a financial transaction under § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). Yet § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) still would not
apply because Puig never promoted the marijuana conspiracy through subsequent conduct.
See United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991); discussion infra Part V.A.
104 See also United States v. Samour, 9 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that
"merely transporting [drug money concealed in an automobile] does not meet the defi-
nition of 'financial transaction' for purposes of money laundering statute").
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Nevertheless, Congress intended "financial transaction" to
cover a wide variety of transactions to further deter the criminal
from engaging in money laundering. If the other elements of
section 1956 are satisfied, the statute criminalizes even simple
transactions between two individuals who merely transfer illegal
proceeds provided the transfer either involves a financial institu-
tion or effects a disposition of the proceeds of the specified illegal
activity. Thus, Congress broadened each element td stretch the
boundaries of money laundering in an effort to halt the flow of
illicit cash through the nation's financial system. As an even great-
er deterrence, each transaction is intended to be a separate of-
fense. 05
4. Proceeds in Fact of Specified Unlawful Activity
Congress intended, by this fourth element, to limit the appli-
cation of section 1956(a)(1). Specifically, Congress carefully select-
ed "specified unlawful activity" to encompass that activity described
in section 1956(c)(7).06 It does not cover all unlawful activity.
The activities are selected to represent those wiih identifiable
proceeds which benefit both the criminal directly and others who
participate in financial transactions conducted by the criminal with
the illegally derived profits.0 These activities include such of-
fenses as RICO predicate offenses defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961,
foreign narcotics violations, continuing criminal enterprise acts
defined by 21 U.S.C. § 848, and those activities appearing in the
laundry list of offenses in section 1956(c)(7)(D), such as bribery,
105 Kacarab, supra note 39, at 10.
106 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The statute includes a host of ac-
tivities which constitute such "specified unlawful activity." For a complete list, see 18
U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7): (A); (B)(i), (ii), (iii); (C); (D); and (E). Some of the other activi-
ties cited in § 1956(c)(7)(D) include:
an offense under section 152 (relating to concealment of assets; false oaths and
claims; bribery), section 215 (relating to commissions or gifts for procuring
loans), any of sections 500 through 503 (relating to certain counterfeiting offens-
es), section 513 (relating to securities of States and private entities), section 542
(relating to entry of goods by means of false statements), section 545 (relating
to smuggling goods into the United States), section 549 (relating to removing
goods from Customs custody), section 641 (relating to public money property, or
records), . . . section 657 (relating to lending, credit, and insurance institu-
tions) ....
Id.
107 Kacarab, supra note 39, at 12.
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theft, embezzlement, and fraud. °8 Thus, the -government must
limit prosecutions to those activities defined by the statute.
Another limiting factor in the application of section
1956(a)(1) arises from the plain language of the statute: It re-
quires proof that the financial transaction "in fact involves the pro-
ceeds of specified unlawful activity.""° Unlike the knowledge ele-
ment which requires merely that the defendant know the proceeds
were derived from some unlawful activity, the government must
further prove that those proceeds did, in fact, constitute the illegal
proceeds of the specified unlawful activity.,
One of the hurdles that the government must address in
meeting this burden is that section 1956 contains no definition of
"proceeds in fact." As a result, the first canon of statutory con-
struction is inapplicable."' In addition, the element escapes ordi-
nary meaning since it has been used as a flexible term by the
government in a host of factual situations. It is unclear whether
Congress intended to include only those funds directly exchanged
for narcotics or funds derived from such exchanges or both."
This distinction is critical in situations where "direct tracing"
proof-proof that monies involved in a financial transaction were
the very same funds directly derived from illegal activity-is not
available to the government. If the statute embodies this narrow
interpretation and strict burden of proof, the government cannot
prosecute a significant number of money launderers since most
take great care in failing to learn the source of the proceeds they
"wash.""' 3 Money launderers often have very little direct involve-
ment with the criminal organization which produces the dirty
proceeds; in fact, in a complex criminal organization, only the se-
lect few who either directly generate the proceeds or those who
represent the "top brass" have concrete proof that the money
washed derives from specified unlawful activity.
In response to the need for a more flexible interpretation,
recent case law has supported a broader reading of the require-
108 See supra note 106.
109 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
110 Kacarab, supra note 39, at 13. The author suggests that proving the proceeds "in
fact" were derived from a specified unlawful activity may be a much heavier burden than
showing, usually through circumstantial evidence, that the defendant knew, or was willful-
ly blind to the fact, that the proceeds or property were from some unlawful activity.
111 See supra note 72 and accompanying text; see also Strafer, supra note 17, at 182.
112 Strafer, supra note 17, at 185.
113 Kacarab, supra note 39, at 14.
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ment that the proceeds are, in fact, derived from a specified un-
lawful activity. Courts do not interpret the statute to require the
government to prove that the proceeds were derived from a partic-
ular sale of narcotics or a specific activity of a criminal organiza-
tion."4 If the government can prove that the defendant has no
other legitimate source of income and that, with all probability,
the funds were derived from an illegal source, the "proceeds in
fact" requirement is satisfied." 5 In meeting this burden, circum-
stantial evidence of the defendant's activities can shed light on the
possibility that the money was derived from specified unlawful
activity. In addition, as stated before, the government need not
prosecute the specified unlawful activity itself to bring a money
laundering charge; money laundering is a separate and distinct
crime from the underlying offense." 6 Thus, these recent rulings
tend to support the flexibility of section 1956(a)(1) in order to
provide the government with a more powerful tool to investigate
and prosecute those financial transactions designed to "wash" ille-
gally derived money or to use the income derived therefrom.
B. "Promotion" as the Fifth Element of Proof
Section 1956(a)(1) provides four alternatives for the fifth
element of proof."' Based upon the facts in each case, the gov-
114 See United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969 (4th Cir. 1994) (in determining whether
the funds used are proceeds of specified unlawful activity, the government is not re-
quired to prove that no untainted funds were involved, or that funds used in transaction
were exclusively derived from specified unlawful activity); United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d
1397 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the government need not trace tainted funds through
each separate interstate transfer from a bank account even though account also con-
tained untainted funds exceeding amount of transfers), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. .1643
(1993); United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1256-57 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that
because the statute "does not require that the government trace the proceeds to a partic-
ular sale," "the government must present sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a
juror could infer each element of the money laundering offense beyond a reasonable
doubt"); see also Kacarab, supra note 39, at 17-18.
115 Blackman, 904 F.2d at 1257.
116 See discussion supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
117 In addition to § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i), three other alternatives are embodied in the §
1956:
(A) (ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section
7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the own-
ership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal
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emnment can seek to apply one of these sections. This Note ad-
dresses primarily section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). Again, this section is
the basis for prosecuting those who, with the knowledge that the
property involved represents the proceeds of some form of unlaw-
ful activity, conducts or seeks to conduct a financial transaction
with such proceeds with the intent to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity.18  In contrast to section
1956(a)(1)(B)(i) which requires only that the potential money
launderer know that the ensuing transaction is designed by the
criminal to conceal the nature of the proceeds, section
1956(a) (1)(A)(i) mandates proof of a specific intent to promote
the underlying activity."'
Although section 1956 contains no definition of the phrase
"promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity," the statu-
tory language of this section is relatively unambiguous. The defen-
dant must engage in a financial transaction with the requisite
knowledge 2 ' of the illegal proceeds,' and, through that trans-
action, must intend to promote the carrying on of activity that the
defendant knew was illegal. In plain ordinary meaning, "promo-
tion" entails the act of contributing to the growth of something or
adding to its prosperity.' In addition, "carrying on" specified
illegal activity connotes the continued existence of the specified
unlawful activity. Thus, the defendant must intend to contribute to
the growth or prosperity of the specified unlawful activity by pro-
moting the carrying on of its existence.
The language used in section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) is not only
similar to conspiracy law," but also reflects the same purpose as
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (1988).
118 See supra note 14 for the full text of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
119 See United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 980-81 (3d Cir. 1994). The promotion
and carrying on can be related to the same specified unlawful activity. But the crux of
this Note addresses whether that underlying activity need be ongoing or simply complet-
ed.
120 See supra Part IVA.l.
121 See supra Part IV.A.4.
122 BLACx'S LAw DICTiONARY ,712 (6th ed. 1990). Specifically, the verb "promote"
means "to contribute to growth, enlargement, or prosperity of; to forward; to further, to
encourage; to advance." Id.
123 See discussion supra Part II.A. If the participants "facilitated" the illicit objectives of
the enterprise by washing the money through their businesses or other organizations,
they were charged for aiding and abetting or conspiring to aid and abet criminals in
their illegal ventures. See also S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 10. The Senate Report
explains that the "intent to facilitate" language of § 1956 is intended to "encompass
situations like those prosecuted under the aiding and abetting statute in which a defen-
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the language used in the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (3).124
Courts apply section 1952(a)(3) to those defendants who facilitate
or further criminal activity even though the underlying crime is
not actually committed or fully completed. 125 Thus, this choice
for the fifth element becomes an effective tool for law enforce-
ment officials who possess documented proof of a financial trans-
action which promoted the criminal activity, but do not possess
sufficient evidence to charge the principals and their participants
with the underlying crime. Those who participate in such transac-
tions are money launderers even if they are never informed of the
exact nature of the underlying unlawful activity that generated the
illegal proceeds.
To further the underlying goal of section 1956-rendering
useless the illegally derived proceeds of unlawful activity-recent
court rulings broadly interpret transactions which "promote" the
carrying on of specified unlawful activity.1 26 While a broad inter-
pretation may expand the government's arsenal in the war on
crime, the courts have a responsibility to fashion rulings consistent
with congressional intent. In some decisions, the courts have ad-
vanced this "promotion" element beyond that which Congress
expressly intended, but which the courts hold Congress impliedly
authorized.
V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1956(a) (1) (A) (i)
In recent years, several circuit courts have reviewed the scope
of section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). As discussed above, courts apply the
dant knowingly furnishes substantial assistance to a person whom he or she is aware will
use that assistance to commit a crime."
124 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) provides, in relevant part:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in
interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to-
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the pro-
motion, management, establishment, or carry on of unlawful activity ....
The government can prosecute under this section even if the underlying crime is not
fully completed or actually committed; the activity must simply further the objective of
unlawful activity. Thus, the language and meaning of this statute and § 1956 are quite
similar.
125 See United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he Travel
Act targets those with intent to promote or carry on or facilitate the promotion or carry-
ing on of any unlawful activity; it is not limited to those who engaged in the unlawful
activity"); United States v. Loucas, 629 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1980) (only intent to violate,
not actual violation of gambling law, was necessary for conviction), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1030 (1987).
126 See discussion infra Part V.
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section differently and emerge with varying results. Sacrificing con-
gressional intent and plain meaning, some of the circuit courts
have extended the section beyond its original purpose.
A. , The Jackson Rationale
In United States v. Jackson,'27 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction of Reverend Joseph Davis
under section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). t23 Davis was a "small-time, hell-
fire and brimstone country preacher" who "served" his parishio-
ners by running two crack houses and actively selling crack."
He deposited the money derived from his enterprise into two
separate accounts to commingle the funds with other legitimate in-
come.' Davis wrote checks from these accounts to cash (for
personal use) and to local vendors who provided beepers and
mobile phones for Davis.' In addition, Davis signed rent checks
and purchased cars from those accounts. 3 2
The court rejected Davis' challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence for the money laundering conviction. The court reasoned
that commingled funds derived, in part, from specified unlawful
activities do not absolve the defendant from a conviction simply
because the government cannot trace the origin of the funds to
determine which funds were used for each transaction. 3 Other-
wise, criminals could easily prevent prosecution under the money
laundering statute simply by commingling funds derived from
specified unlawful activities with legitimate sources.M
127 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991).
128 In addition, Davis was also indicted and convicted of one count of engaging in a
continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 and one count of conspir-
ing to distribute over fifty grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and 846. Mandell Jackson and Romano Gines were also convicted under 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 846. The court affirmed the convictions of all defendants but remanded
the Gines conviction for resentencing.
129 Jackson, 935 F.2d at 836.
130 Id. at 836-37. The two accounts were the "Development Corporation Account, and
the "Church Account;" these accounts also included funds from more legitimate activities,
such as "bird-dogging" in which Davis steered his parishioners and others to used car
outlets in the East St. Louis area in return for commissions from the dealers.
131 Id. at 837.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 839.
134 Id. The court added that "the commingling in this case is itself suggestive of a
design to hide the source of ill-gotten gains that the government must prove under sec-
tion 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)." Id.
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Most significantly, the court recognized that a conviction un-
der section 1956 involves more than simply conducting transac-
tions using dirty money.135 The court explained that the govern-
ment bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
"the party engaged in the transaction knew that the funds used
represented, in whole or in part, proceeds of unlawful activity and
intended the transaction to promote one of the varieties of crimi-
nal conduct identified in section 1956(c) (7)."136
The court agreed that Davis' purchase of beepers promoted
his continuing criminal enterprise.3 7  Since section
1956(a) (1) (A) (i) is aimed at the "practice of plowing back the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity to promote that activity,""s
the purchase of the beepers did, in fact, plow back the proceeds
of narcotics sales to promote the efficiency of that activity. Davis'
drug runners used the beepers to keep in contact with Davis.
Thus, they were an integral part of the enterprise and furthered
its goals of illegal narcotics sales.Y19 The court therefore held that
Davis violated section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). "
Interestingly, the court found that neither the mobile phone
purchases nor the rental payments were intended to promote the
continuing criminal enterprise as required by section
1956(a) (1) (A) (i).Y The phones did not further the drug activity
in any way. Likewise, the rental checks and checks written to cash
"maintained Davis' lifestyle, but more than this is needed to es-
tablish that they promoted his drug activities."142 Thus, the court
135 Id. at 840. See also Lawrence, supra note 29, at 851.
136 Jackson, 935 F.2d at 840 (emphasis added).
137 Id. at 841.
138 Id. at 842
139 Id. at 840. As the court stated,
Pierre Manley testified that Davis gave him a beeper when he began to serve as
one of Davis' runners, and that Davis would call Manley's beeper to tell him to
contact Davis. . . .This and other evidence of the use of beepers as an integral
part of Davis' conduct of his continuing criminal enterprise suffice to establish
that the use of the funds derived from Davis' drug activities to purchase beepers
was intended to promote this activity, establishing a violation of §
1956(a) (1) (A) (i).
Id.
140 Id. at 840.
141 Id. at 841.
142 Id. The court, however, did find that these activities fell within the ambit of §
1956(a) (1) (B) (i) since Davis converted cash into goods and services as a way of conceal-
ing or disguising the source of funds. Checks were written to conceal or disguise the
true nature of the proceeds. A conviction under § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) requires only that
the defendant knew the purpose of the transaction was to conceal the source or nature
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established a stringent definition of promotion: The defendant
must intend to use the proceeds to further the specific underlying
crime, rather than to merely spend the ill-gotten gains of his crime.
The Tenth Circuit further applied a strict interpretation of
section 1956(a)(1). In United States v. Sanders,4' the court reject-
ed the argument that the money laundering statute should be
interpreted broadly to encompass all transactions which involve the
proceeds of unlawful activity. The Sanders court cautioned, "[t]o so
interpret the statute would, in the court's view, turn the money
laundering statute into a 'money spending statute'."' 4
4
In Sanders, the court declined to apply the money laundering
statute to the defendants' purchase of two automobiles. Although
the purchases were made with the knowledge that the money used
for the transaction represented the proceeds of a drug sale, the
Sanders 'court recognized that this transaction did not fall within
the scope of the money laundering statute, specifically section
1956(a) (1) (B) (i); the Sanderses did not attempt to conceal their
identity as the car purchasers." s In essence, the Sanderses merely
spent their dirty money in an ordinary transaction with neither
the intent to promote their underlying drug sales nor the intent
to conceal the source or nature of the proceeds from such activity.
As the court explained, Congress intended that the transactions
criminalized under the statute must fall within the express terms
of the statute.1 46 Thus, the Sanders court, like Jackson, recognized
the need for courts to limit application of the money laundering
of the illegal proceeds. See supra note 52.
143 This case actually encompasses two prosecutions: United States v. Sanders, 929
F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1991) (defendant was Renee Armstrong Sanders) and, United States
v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir.) (defendant was Johnny Lee Sanders, husband of
Renee Armstrong Sanders), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 845 (1991). In the interest of simplicity,
subsequent cites to these cases are taken from the latter opinion.
144 Sanders, 928 F.2d at 944.
145 Id. This case was brought under § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i): "knowing the transaction is
designed in whole or in part - to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the
source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; . . .
shall be sentenced to a fine . . . or imprisonment for not more than twenty years or
both." Although the focus of this Note is on § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the court's interpreta-
tion of congressional intent is relevant and consistent with the Jackson rationale.
146 Sanders, 928 F.2d at 944. Here, the court focused on the express terms of §
1956(a) (1) (B) (i). The court insisted that the purpose of the money laundering statute is
to reach transactions- intended to disguise the relationship of the items purchased with
the person providing the proceeds from specified unlawful activity. Similarly, Congress
intended only to reach those transactions designed to promote the carrying on of speci-
fled unlawful activity under § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i).
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statute to factual situations which warrant its use. By extension,
section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) criminalizes transactions which "promote
the carrying on" of specified unlawful activity. To read this section
broadly to encompass any transaction would ignore its particular
and distinguishable purpose.
B. The Montoya Rationale
After Jackson, several circuit courts sought to expand section
1956(a) (1) (A) (i) beyond its express scope. In the process, the
Jackson rationale evolved as circuit courts broadened its rationale
and limited its interpretation of the statute's target-to criminalize
the practice of "plowing back the proceeds" of the specified unlaw-
ful activity to promote that activity.
In United States v. Montoya,1"7 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction of California State Senator
Joseph B. Montoya for money laundering under section
1956(a) (1) (A) (i)." 8 Montoya was convicted after he deposited
into his personal checking account a $3000 check he received
from Peach State Capitol, an Alabama shrimp company that was
lobbying for passage of certain legislation."' Peach State Capitol
was, in fact, a fictitious FBI front company designed to investigate
unlawful corruption by certain members of the California legisla-
ture. Montoya was a member of the legislative committee which
was considering the bill, and records indicate that he did, in fact,
vote in favor of its passage. 5 ' In essence, the $3000 check was
derived from the proceeds of a bribery transaction under both
state and federal law, and the bribery transaction constituted
"specified unlawful activity" under section 1956(c) (7) (D). '5
On appeal, Montoya advanced two arguments for reversal of
his conviction, both of which the court summarily rejected. First,
he argued that the check was a "legitimate honorarium" deposited
without any attempt to conceal the transaction; therefore, he
147 945 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1991).
148 Senator Montoya was also convicted of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c) (1988). However, the court reversed his convictions for extortion and attempted
extortion under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988) ("Hobbs
Act").
149 Montoya, 945 F.2d at 1074.
150 Id. at 1077. It is undisputed that Montoya told another 'member of the California
Senate that he expected at least $2,500 for his support, and ultimately, set the payment
$3,000, commenting that "you don't want to appear ridiculous." Id.
151 Id. at 1074, 1075 & n.5.
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lacked the intent to launder.'52 The court responded with a
clarification of section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i): "[A]n intent to launder,
disguise or thwart detection of the source or purpose of monies
deposited into a bank is not a required element of [section
1956(a) (1) (A) (i)]." 153 The section requires a different element of
proof-the "intent to promote the carrying on of specified activi-
ty.
Second, Montoya argued that the deposit could not have
promoted the bribery since the bribery was already completed
upon receipt of the check from the undercover agent.'54 There-
fore, there existed no ongoing unlawful activity to further or facili-
tate. The court again responded in a somewhat short and pointed
manner. Mofntoya promoted the carrying out of the illegal bribery
by depositing the check and characterizing the funds as a legit-
imate honorarium.' Otherwise, Montoya could not have made
use of the funds without such a deposit. Although the statute's
literal words require the intent to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity, the court applied it to Montoya even
though the bribery was essentially completed upon receipt of the
check. Essentially, Montoya never plowed back the proceeds of the
specified unlawful activity, for the criminal enterprise was already
dismantled before he deposited the check.
Indeed, Montoya benefited personally from the deposit of the
check, yet as the Jackson court recognized, "more than that is
needed" to establish that it promoted the bribery transaction. 55
The defendant must further that activity in some way. However, the
specified unlawful activity (bribery) was essentially completed when
Montoya placed the check in his suit coat. It seems logically incon-
152 Id. at 1074. Montoya argued that a legitimate honorarium is permissible under
state law and was therefore not deposited into his personal bank account "with the intent
to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity." Id.
153 Id. at 1076. The court noted that § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) requires the government to
prove that the defendant deposited the funds "to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, or source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity." Id. Sections 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) and (a) (1) (B) (i) are aimed at different activities.
Montoya was not charged under § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i).
154 Id.
155 Id. This standard ("carrying out") represents a seemingly subtle variation of the
statutory standard, yet Montoya signaled an expansive but erroneous view contrary to the
narrow scope applied by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits in Jackson and Sander, respec-
tively.
156 See United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1991); discussion supra
Part V.A.
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sistent to equate the carrying out of the underlying unlawful activi-
ty with the statutory requirement that Montoya "promoted the
carrying on" of bribery after the bribery transaction was already
completed. Nevertheless, this interpretation of "promoting the
carrying on" has led to a trend for circuit courts to uphold proof
of this element of section 1956(a) (1) even in the absence of an
ongoing venture which promises future criminal conduct.
In United States v. Paramo,57 for example, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit upheld Alberto Paramo's conviction for
money laundering under section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). 58  Paramo's
conviction resulted from his participation in a scheme to embezzle
IRS tax refund checks. Paramo retrieved the tax refund checks
mailed by an IRS tax examiner to a fictitious payee at a New York
City mailing address.159 He then mailed the checks to his brother
in Philadelphia who deposited them into his own account. His
brother then withdrew the money and distributed the pro-
ceeds."6 Although Paramo argued that none of the proceeds ob-
tained from earlier acts of mail fraud were used to facilitate the
subsequent acts of fraud, the jury returned a guilty verdict, per-
haps assisted by the trial court's hesitant instruction: "To deter-
mine whether the defendant promoted or facilitated . . .the carry-
ing on the-carrying out of the past mail fraud .. .you can pro-
mote, facilitate, or assist in ways other than-prospectively or in
the future .... It could be a past mail fraud."'61
The court conceded the lack of evidence that any of the
participants reinvested, or funneled, their proceeds back into the
mail fraud scheme or purchased any equipment to assist them in
continuing the scheme. 62  As the court explained,
157 998 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1076 (1994).
158 The government offered Paramo and two other defendants an opportunity to
enter plea agreements after they all agreed to cooperate and explain the criminal enter-
prise. The other two defendants accepted the agreement and pled guilty to the charges
against them. They received sentences of eighteen months and twenty-four months respec-
tively. Paramo, however, refused to plead guilty to money laundering charges and argued
instead that the specified section under which he was charged, § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i), did
not apply to his conduct and participation in the criminal enterprise. At trial, he conced-
ed all of the factual predicates of the money laundering charges, but denied that these
facts supported a conviction under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). Id. at 1214-15.
159 Id. at 1214.
160 Id. Paramo was also charged with mail fraud and money laundering as an aider
and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2.
161 Id. at 1215 (emphasis added). This jury instruction, which was clearly derived
from the Montoya rationale, blurred the requisite element of promoting the carrying on
of subsequent acts of fraud.
162 Id. at 1216. Paramo based his argument on the insufficiency of evidence to estab-
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"[u]ncontradicted evidence shows that Paramo and the other par-
ticipants spent their respective shares of the mail fraud proceeds
on personal items for themselves and their family members.""6
In this context, the Jackson rationale should be triggered: The
intent to promote the carrying on of unlawful activity cannot be
inferred merely because the defendants used their proceeds to pay
personal expenses or to purchase consumer goods.' Although
the money from the IRS checks may have helped maintain
Paramo's lifestyle, as the rental payments and mobile phone pur-
chases did for Jackson, "more than this is needed" to establish
that he promoted his mail fraud. As the Sanders court suggested,
the money laundering statute is not a "money spending stat-
ute."" Rather, evidence that the defendant plowed back the
proceeds of the specified unlawful activity should have been neces-
sary to support a conviction."6
Since the facts of this case did not support such a finding,
the court ignored the Jackson rationale as a necessary element for
a violation of section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) and recharacterized the
government's argument in terms consistent with Montoya: Paramo
intended to promote mail fraud when the checks were converted
into cash, not when he used the money, for personal supplies."
The court explained that although section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) is
aimed at the practice of plowing back the proceeds of the spec-
ified unlawful activity, "nowhere did the court [in Jackson] ...
delineate the universe of conduct prohibited under [section]
1956 (a) (1) (A) (i), or decide whether a defendant could violate that
section other than by plowing back the proceeds of unlawful activ-
ity."'" Ignoring the teachings of Jackson, the court specifically re-
lied on Montoya and adopted its reasoning. Since "promotion"
involves a contribution to the growth and prosperity of the activity,
the court deduced that Paramo could engage in financial transac-
tions which promote ongoing future activity as well as prior activi-
lish the requisite intent of the statute.
163 Id. at 1217.
164 See discussion supra Part V.A.
165 United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1991). See discussion supra
Part V.A. The Sanders court cautioned against a broad interpretation of § 1956 to encom-
pass al! transactions which involve the proceeds of unlawful activity.
166 See discussion supra Part V.A.
167 Paramo, 998 F.2d at 1217.
168 Id. at 1218.
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ty.169 As such, Paramo, like Montoya, promoted his specified un-
lawful activity by depositing and, in the instant case, cashing the
checks. Although each offense of mail fraud was technically com-
pleted upon receipt of the check in New York, the court reasoned
that Paramo nevertheless believed that the checks were worthless
unless exchanged for cash or negotiable currency. 7 1 Therefore,
his check cashing promoted each antecedent fraud and contribut-
ed to its growth by creating value out of an otherwise valueless
scheme; Paramo specifically intended a profitable enterprise by
mail fraud.
The Paramo court addressed both Jackson and Montoya to fur-
ther expand the scope of section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). However, the
court was eager to adopt the reasoning of Montoya and to disre-
gard the statutory boundaries recognized in Jackson. While, like
Montoya, the Paramo court carefully analyzed the element of "pro-
motion," it simply read "promote the carrying on of specified un-
lawful activity" out of the statute. Nowhere does the evidence re-
flect that Paramo promoted the carrying on of mail fraud by de-
positing the checks; the mail fraud did not carry on beyond the
actual receipt of the tax refund check in the mail. Nevertheless,
following Paramo, section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) not only encompasses
the practice of plowing back the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity to promote it, but also includes transactions which contrib-
ute to the completion of prior unlawful activity.' This recent ex-
pansion, which reads the additional step of "carrying on the speci-
fied unlawful activity" out of the statute, begs the question: Can
the courts construe the statute to extend this far in light of the
unambiguous language of section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i)?
A fifth recent case answered in the affirmative. In United States
v. Cavalier,72 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit followed
the Third and Ninth Circuits' expansion of "promotion" under the
statute. Cavalier was indicted and convicted for conducting a fi-
nancial transaction involving the proceeds of mail fraud, with the
169 Id. at 1217.
170 Id. The court looked to Paramo's state of mind to avoid being hindered in its
analysis by the lack of evidence of ongoing unlawful activity.
171 After the Ninth Circuit opinion in United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068 (9th
Cir. 1991), some argue that § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) encompassed those activities which pro-
mote not only ongoing or future activity but also prior unlawful activity. See supra notes
146-55 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, Paramo solidified this broad interpretation
and offered added strength to Montoya so that other circuit courts would read the statute
with the same expansive scope.
172 17 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1994).
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intent to promote the carrying on of the mail fraud, in violation
of section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). The conviction was based upon
evidence of Cavalier's scheme to defraud Allstate Insurance Corpo-
ration by fraudulently reporting the theft of his nephew's van after
shipping and selling it in Honduras.'74 As a result of this
scheme, Allstate mailed GMAC a check to satisfy a lien on the
van."7 Although Cavalier himself did not conduct the financial
transaction involving the illegal proceeds of his mail fraud-the
mailing of the pay-off check to GMAC-he was punished as a
principal since he caused the transaction to be conducted.7 '
Cavalier was charged with aiding and abetting mail fraud for his
use of the mail to deliver the false theft report and with money
laundering based upon the financial transaction involving the
proceeds of his mail fraud, i.e., Allstate's transfer of the check to
GMAC. 17
7
Cavalier set forth the "completion argument" as his defense:
The mail fraud scheme was completed when he mailed the false
claim to Allstate. Therefore, Allstate's act of transferring the check
to GMAC could not promote the already completed specified
unlawful activity, the mail fraud.78 Citing Paramo and Montoya,
the court rejected Cavalier's argument and reiterated the principle
that a defendant can conduct a financial transaction with the
intent to promote an already completed activity. 7' Here, the
transfer of the check from Allstate promoted the overall scheme
to defraud Allstate by extinguishing the lien on the van and reliev-
ing Cavalier of further payments. 8 Although the court conceded
that the specified unlawful activity, i.e., mail fraud, was completed
173 Id. at 91.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 91. Cavalier devised this scheme after he could no longer make payments
on the van himself. The car was sold for $10,000 in Honduras. Allstate mailed GMAC a
check for $9,749.50.
176 Id. at 92. This argument is sustained under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1988) which pro-
vides: "whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal."
177 Id. at 91. "Aiding and abetting mail fraud" violates 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342.
178 Cavalier, 17 F.3d at 92.
179 Id.
180 Id. The district court decision also noted that the "satisfaction of... debt to
GMAC was an integral part of the overall [fraud] scheme involving the van." Therefore,
the transfer of the check effectively promoted this integral part of the mail fraud. Id. at
93 n.4.
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prior to Allstate's action, it found that the check contributed to its
success.
181
The court, however, did not differentiate this type of "promo-
tion" from the type proscribed by Jackson. In fact, unlike Paramo,
the court employed the language of Jackson to describe Cavalier's
activities. As the court concluded, "Cavalier caused to be reinvest-
ed or plowed back the proceeds of his mail fraud to promote his
overall scheme to defraud Allstate."'82 He did not simply spend
his ill-gotten gains on personal items. Perhaps the court's use of
such deliberate terminology as "plowing back the proceeds" re-
flects a desire to both adhere to congressional intent and target
the specific conduct which the statute seeks to criminalize."' Al-
though Cavalier rested upon Paramo and Montoya to the extent it
finds "promotion" in relation to prior or completed unlawful activ-
ity, Cavalier implicitly recognized the need for a consistent applica-
tion of "promotion" to advance the overall goals of section
1956(a) (1). Yet Cavalier still neglected to acknowledge the equally
important criteria under section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i): The financial
transaction must promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful
activity. As a result, the rule of Montoya-conduct can promote the
carrying on of completed activity-remains the focal point of in-
consistency among the circuit courts in the application of section
1956(a) (1) (A) (i).
Most recently, the Second Circuit analyzed section
1956(a) (1) (A) (i) and aligned with the Fifth Circuit in adopting
the Montoya rationale. The court declared that a violation of this
section is not limited to laundering which only promotes subse-
quent criminal activity. In United States v. Piervinanzi,'5 the Sec-
ond Circuit addressed section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) and its application
to factual situations in which the specified unlawful activity is al-
ready completed. The defendant was convicted for attempted mon-
ey laundering charges arising from his scheme to fraudulently wire
transfer funds overseas from an account in the United States in
181 As the court explained, "It is undisputed that Allstate's transfer of a check to
GMAC furthered Cavalier's scheme to defraud by extinguishing the lien on the van....
[B]y furthering the overall scheme of which the completed mail fraud was a part,
Allstate's transfer ... contributed to the prosperity of, and therefore promoted the com-
pleted mail fraud." Id. at 93.
182 Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
183 See United States v. Jackson, 953 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991); discussion supra
Part V.A.
184 23 F.3d 670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 259 (1994).
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two separate but related bank fraud schemes."s Piervinanzi was
charged with a host of crimes, including conspiracy to commit
wire fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering."6 Although this
case involved the prosecution of the defendant under section
1956(a) (2),187 the court analyzed the similar language of section
1956(a) (1)(A)(i), that a financial transaction be undertaken "with
the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activ-
ity." Piervinanzi argued that to promote his activity, the proceeds
from his wire fraud and attempted bank fraud must have been
"plowed back." However, the court referenced its previous ruling
in this area"ss and affirmed its view that the language of this sec-
185 The two bank fraud schemes, the Irving Trust Scheme and the Morgan Guaranty
Scheme, were never consummated. In the first scheme, a co-conspirator left out the iden-
tity of the American correspondent bank for the bank in the Cayman Islands to which
the defendants were trying to wire $14 million. In the second scheme, the clerk at the
bank from which the funds were wired reported the suspicious nature of the transaction,
and the wire transfer of $24 million to a bank in London was immediately stopped and
reversed. In both schemes, Piervinanzi was recruited to provide security for the operation
since his ties to organized crime gave him experience in this area.
186 Specifically, in count one, he and another defendant were charged with conspira-
cy to commit wire fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
371. Count two charged him and another defendant with attempted bank fraud in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2. Count three charged him with attempted money laun-
dering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(2) and 2. Count four charged him with wire
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2. Count five charged him with attempted
bank fraud, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2. Count six charged him with attempted
money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(2) and 2. Finally, count seven
charged him with money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957(a) and 2.
Piervinanzi was convicted on all counts at the initial trial. Piervinanz4 23 F.3d at 674.
187 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2) (1988). The relevant portion of the statute provides:
(2) Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit
or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to
or through a place outside the United States or to a place in the United States
from or through a place outside the United States-
(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activi-
ty; . .
shall be sentenced to a fine of $500,000 or twice the value of the monetary
instrument or funds involved in the transportation, transmission, or transfer,
whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or
both . . . .
Id. Section 1956(a) (2) targets international money laundering; § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) applies
to domestic money laundering. Although § 1956(a)(2) does not require that the "pro-
ceeds" used are generated first by unlawful activity followed by a financial transaction, the
similar language of § 1956(a)(2) employed in this section provides an additional guide to
an interpretation of § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). The court's analysis is therefore relevant to the
discussion of the scope of "promoting the carrying on" of specified unlawful activity since
this statutory requirement is identical in both sections.
188 See United States v. Skinner, 945 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that §
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tion applies to specified unlawful activity already completed but
nevertheless promoted by subsequent transactions which contribute
to its growth and prosperity. As the court explained, "[b]ecause
transferring the funds overseas .. . was integral to the. success of
both fraudulent schemes, it is undeniable that the attempted trans-
fers were designed to 'promote' the underlying bank fraud."89
Piervinanzi also advanced the argument that the prohibition
against "carrying on" of the specified unlawful activity is rendered
meaningless unless "carrying on" specifically proscribes continuous
criminal activity, which the facts did not support in his case. 9 ' In
response, the court dissected this phrase and concluded that "car-
rying on" in section 1956(a) (2) has essentially the same meaning
as "conducts" in section 1956(a) (1); it does not necessarily con-
note "continuous criminal activity."191 Additionally, the court in-
terpreted "specified unlawful activity" to include singular offenses;
thus, a violation of section 1956 is satisfied "by the carrying on of
a single offense of bank fraud" even if the offense is already com-
pleted. 92 The court applied this rather specious analysis and re-
jected Piervinanzi's argument based upon the Jackson rationale,
since, in the court's view, Jackson never established that a defen-
dant may be deemed to promote the carrying on of unlawful
activity only when the money laundering promotes subsequent
criminal activity. As the court implied without further analysis, sec-
tion 1956 is not limited to such a narrow universe of conduct.9 3
Thus, both section 1956(a)(2) and section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) en-
compass situations other than those geared to "plow back the
proceeds" of illegal activity. The court validated this broad inter-
pretation of the statute by citing Montoya, Paramo, and Cavalier."'
The Piervinanzi court dismissed Jackson as a limited holding
designed to establish only one avenue to prove a violation of the
1956(a) (1) (A) (i) applied to the transportation of money orders since the money orders
facilitated the sale of cocaine even though the cocaine purchases were completed before
the money orders were transported).
189 Pierrinanzi, 23 F.3d at 679.
190 Id. at 680.
191 Id.
192 Id. The court attempted to derive justification from § 1956(c)(7) since that sec-
tion describes the specified unlawful activity as "any act or activity constituting an offense"
and "an offense."
193 Id. at 681. The court was unpersuaded by the defendant's references to Jackson in
this context. Like Paramo, the court limited Jackson's holding to proscribe only one way
to violate the section of the statute. Jackson did not, as the Piervinanzi court suggested,
structure the outer boundaries of the conduct prohibited by § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i).
194 Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d at 681-82.
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statute, i.e., plowing back the proceeds of unlawful activity to capi-
talize and expand the criminal enterprise.'95 Under such reason-
ing, Jackson never established that the language of the statute
applies only when the laundering promotes subsequent or contin-
uous unlawful activity. As the court concluded, "such a reading
would not accord with the plain meaning of the statute." 9'
Thus, Pieroinanzi, like Montoya, Paramo, and Cavalier, fashioned
an application of section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) to the facts of the case.
The courts seem bent on recognizing the "plain meaning" of the
statute as authorization for prosecution of any type of subsequent
activity performed with the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,
whether or not that activity is consistent with the ordinary mean-
ing of "promoting the carrying on of specified activity." Is this
what Congress intended? As an expansive tool for the prosecution
of money launderers, judicial interpretation and application of the
statute to uphold such convictions would seem to align with the
ultimate goal of the statute, but not with congressional intent
therein. The only justification for this "reach" by the courts is to
further the ultimate goal of thwarting the pocketbook of crime in
any manner.
VI. CONSEQUENCES AND PRACTICAL REPERCUSSIONS
As a result of the Montoya interpretation of section
1956(a) (1) (A) (i), other circuit courts have followed its reasoning
without considering the statutory language or the underlying con-
gressional intent. Perhaps the Montoya rationale furnishes an easy
solution to factual situations which pose a potential money laun-
dering scenario. Even if the specified unlawful activity is essentially
complete, defendants have laundered money if, in fact, they con-
vert the proceeds obtained into a manageable form for personal
use. The Montoya rationale thus can be followed to its logical ex-
treme: Every sale of drugs is an automatic money laundering viola-
tion as soon as the money changes hands. Not only is this exten-
sion inconsistent with congressional intent, but it potentially con-
verts the money laundering statute into the "money spending stat-
ute" which the Sanders court carefully avoided.' 97 In contrast,
Congress targeted very narrow conduct to fill the gap in criminal
195 Id. at 681.
196 Id.
197 See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 440, 444 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
845 (1991); discussion supra Part V.A.
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law in the area of post-crime hiding of ill-gotten gains of specified
unlawful activity. 9 Yet understood in a Montoya context, section
1956(a) (1) (A) (i) would criminalize the very same conduct already
criminalized by previous drug laws and other statutes which pro-
scribe the substantive crime.'9
In 1994, an additional Tenth Circuit opinion and a Fourth
Circuit ruling have countered the Montoya trend by focusing the
money laundering inquiry back within the purview of the statutory
language, while an additional Third Circuit ruling further clouds
the issue.00
In United States v. Dimeck,2°' the Tenth Circuit reversed the
defendant's conviction of conspiring to launder money under sec-
tion 1956(a) (1) (B) (i). The conviction was based merely on the
delivery of alleged drug money by the defendant to a second
courier, who was to deliver the money to the seller of the
drugs.0 2 Although the defendant was prosecuted under section
198 See supra note 14 and accompanying text; United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239,
1243 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that Congress intended simply to add a new criminal
offense to punish activity not previously punished criminally).
199 To criminalize virtually every transaction conducted with the proceeds of unlawful
activity runs afoul of Congress's intention to add an entirely new criminal offense to pun-
ish activity not formerly proscribed. See discussion supra Part III; see also United States v.
Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1223 (3d Cir. 1993) (Rosenn, J., dissenting). As Judge Rosenn
observed, "[slimply enjoying the fruits of illegal conduct does not further or promote
that conduct; rather, that is part of the original crime for which the defendant has typi-
cally already received punishment." Id.
200 United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970 (3d Cir. 1994). See discussion infra notes
233-43 and accompanying text.
201 24 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 1994). This case deals primarily with § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i),
but is relevant to this Note in terms of its focus on the congressional intent of §
1956(a)(1) in general.
202 Id. at 1239. The defendant Dimeck argued that a more appropriate charge would
have been § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) rather than § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The court declined to
express an opinion on this argument since this issue was not before the court. However,
Dimeck's argument has merit. Dimeck's sole role in this marijuana conspiracy was to
collect the Detroit funds and to deliver them to the courier (a government informant)
in a hotel room for delivery back to the supplier. Dimeck did arrive in his company van
bearing a "Michigan Satellite Systems" logo and did transport the $60,000 in a box with
the same name. Therefore, the money was not in plain view. However, the box was un-
sealed and untaped. As noted before, § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) criminalizes financial transac-
tions conducted with the proceeds of specified unlawful activity knowing that the transac-
tion was designed to conceal or disguise the nature, the source or ownership of the
proceeds. It can be argued that Dimeck did not intend to conceal the money directly by
using a box with his company's logo on it; it seems the box was probably used simply
for easy transportation. A stronger argument could be advanced under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)
since Dimeck essentially promoted the continuing marijuana sales by plowing back the
Detroit funds to the criminal enterprise itself. Dimeck knew that those funds would ulti-
mately find their way into the original supplier's hands.
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1956(a) (1) (B) (i), the court's analysis of congressional intent of
section 1956(a) (1) as a whole provides relevant insight.
Reflecting on the legislative history of section 1956, the court
stressed that the statute intended to create a new federal offense
for money laundering, rather than to "afford an alternative means
of punishing the prior 'specified unlawful activity.'"23 The court
also reviewed Edgmon?°' and Sanders as it reexamined the purpose
of section 1956: "Congress intended simply to add a new criminal
offense to punish activity that was not previously punished crimi-
nally." °" The court carefully dissected the evidence to determine
if, in fact, it revealed the kind of transaction prohibited by the
specified section of the statute.21 6 Because the government failed
to show that the defendant's conduct fit within the language of
the statute-the conduct was designed to disguise or conceal the
attributes of the illegal proceeds-the court declined to extend
the scope of the statute to encompass any transaction which in-
volves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.27
Thus, the Tenth Circuit squarely underscored a difference in
approach of the circuit courts as they consider convictions brought
under section 1956. The specific facts must be analyzed to deter-
mine whether they fit within the exact language of the statute
even if this heightened scrutiny results in the reversal of convic-
tions. In essence, some transactions simply are not those targeted
by the statute. If courts ignore the narrow purpose of the statute
simply to convict more defendants, they are ignoring their respon-
sibility to construe the law consistent with congressional intent.
Recently, in United States v. Heaps,"' the Fourth Circuit de-
clined to extend section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) to the transfer of money
orders which represented the proceeds of a drug sale to a DEA
agent. The defendant's conviction at the trial level arose out of his
participation in a conspiracy to possess and distribute
methlendioxyamphetamine (MDA), commonly known as "ecsta-
sy."209 The defendant supplied ecstasy to other distributors who
203 Id. at 1244 (quoting United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (10th Cir.
1991)).
204 See discussion supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
205 Dimeck, 24 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1213-14).
206 Dimeck, 24 F.3d at 1245. Again, the specified subsection is § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i)
which differs from § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) in the kind of transactions prohibited. See supra
notes 14 & 52 for the sections' specific statutory language.
207 Id. at 1245.
208 39 F.3d 479 (4th Cir. 1994).
209 Id. at 479-80. The defendant was charged and convicted of conspiracy to possess
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then resold the pills, unknowingly, to DEA Agent Valentine.210
Heaps instructed his customers to send him a money order
through Western Union in the name of "Stacey Maire," the
defendant's girlfriend.211 These money orders were payments for
ecstasy previously supplied and represented the proceeds of the
sale of ecstasy to the DEA agent. The money orders were cashed
upon receipt.212 The money was then stored in a money box in a
drawer of the defendant's house.213 The trial court held that the
wire transfer to Stacey Maire promoted the carrying on of the
specified unlawful activity under section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i).
214
On appeal, the defendant argued that, for two reasons, the
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction under section
1956(a) (1) (A) (i): "[T]he government never established that [the
defendant] knew the money represented the proceeds of unlawful
activity ... and the government failed to prove that the transac-
tion was intended to promote the carrying on of specified unlaw-
ful activity .... 5 In response, the court used circumstantial
evidence to show that the defendant had actual subjective
knowledge that the proceeds were derived from drug sales.1 6
The evidence revealed not only that the defendant was friends
with those to whom he supplied ecstasy, but that his supply was
their primary means of support.2 17 Thus, a jury could reasonably
and distribute ecstasy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; conspiracy to commit money laun-
dering, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 371; distribution of ecstasy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 2; and, money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2.
210 Heaps, 39 F.3d at 481. Heaps sold a substantial amount of pills to Gillian Beck
and Geoffrey Boccia who then, unknowingly, sold them to an undercover DEA agent,
Robert Valentine.
211 Id. Stacey Maire and the defendant were later married.
212 Id. at 482. Specifically, there were two money orders. One was sent in the
amount of $1500 and the other for $500. After the wire transfer and at the direction of
the defendant, Stacey Maire picked up the $2000 in New York.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 483. The conviction was also brought under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) since the
wire transfers "were designed to disguise the source, ownership, or control of the pro-
ceeds of the unlawful activity." Id.
215 Id. at 483. See supra note 14 for the full text of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). Heaps also
argued that the government failed to prove that the transaction was designed to conceal
or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity. See supra note 52 for the full text of §
1956(a) (1) (B) (i).
216 Heaps, 39 F.3d at 484. See United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1331 (1993); discussion supra Part IV.A.1; see also supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
217 Heaps, 39 F.3d at 484. The court stated that the evidence was sufficient for a
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infer that Heaps knew the wire transfer actually represented the
proceeds of drug sales."'
The court then addressed the second prong of the
defendant's argument-the evidence did not establish "promotion"
under section 1956(a),(1) (A) (i). The government asserted that the
transfers were completed to establish goodwill necessary to pro-
mote future sales of ecstasy. 1 Since the government presented
no evidence that the payments promoted goodwill or that there
were subsequent drug transactions, the court rejected this theory
of promotion.2 , The Fourth Circuit characterized the payments
as merely satisfying the debt of a completed and final transaction;
they did not promote the carrying on of the drug sales by encour-
aging similar transactions.2' Moreover, the court rejected the
government's argument that the, money orders completed the
antecedent drug distributions, and therefore, such completion was
sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction in light of Paramo,
Montoya and Cavalier12 The court distinguished these cases and
held that Heaps' particular transaction simply was not the type of
transaction targeted by section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i); it was merely the
consummation of the sale of ecstasy, for which the defendant was
already charged and convicted.2 ' As the court stated, if the
defendant's only crime, the acceptance of the payment for drugs,
was deemed as the kind of transaction which promoted the under-
lying unlawful activity, then "virtually every sale of drugs would be
an automatic money laundering violation as soon as money
changed hands."24 This expansive reach of the statute does not
conform with the underlying purpose of section 1956 since it
rational trier of fact to conclude "that the defendant knew the money sent him as pay-
ment for illegal drugs was itself derived from the sale of illegal drugs." Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 485.
220 Id. The court noted that none of the government's witnesses testified that the
money orders were sent to encourage the defendant to supply more drugs. Those who
sent the money orders explained that they were sent 'as payment for drugs previously
supplied.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 484-85. The government relied on Paramo, Montoya, and Cavalier both to
support its assertion that completion alone is sufficient to sustain the conviction and to
argue that "the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant caused the
proceeds from the drug sales to be plowed back to promote his overall scheme to pos-
sess and distribute drugs." Id. The court distinguished all three cases and, accordingly,
found the government's argument unpersuasive.
223 Id. at 485.
224 Id. at 485-86.
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"criminalizes the very same conduct already criminalized by the
drug laws." 5
In support of its holding, the court tracked the legislative
intent of section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). Importantly, the court focused
on the purpose of this section-to satisfy the need for a federal
criminal offense "aimed directly at the activity of laundering the
money gained from illegal activity. " "s Moreover, Congress intend-
ed money laundering and the specified unlawful activity to be sep-
arate crimes separately punishable. 7 As the court stated, "Con-
gress intended to prevent an ill other than those already prohibit-
ed by other laws.""8 Thus, the court declined to interpret broad-
ly the statute to encompass the mere receipt of a money transfer
and the placement of cash in a drawer.' In effect, the court
avoided this broad interpretation which would essentially make any
drug transaction a money laundering crime.
The Heaps court also relied on the Jackson rationale to remove
the case from the purview of section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). Like Jack-
son, none of the available evidence established that the defendant
"promoted the carrying on" of the possession and distribution of
drugs. The mere receipt of defendant's money transfer and sub-
sequent act of placing the cash in a money box in the defendant's
home did not plow back the proceeds from the drug sales to
promote the overall drug conspiracy."' Perhaps the money
cashed was to contribute to the defendant's lifestyle, but "more
than this is needed to establish that they promoted his drug activi-
ties."23' Thus, the Heaps court established a standard for consis-
tent application of section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i): The defendant must
intend not only to consummate the sale of drugs (for which he or
she is charged under other laws), but more specifically, to pro-
225 Id.
226 Id. at 486 (quoting United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (10th Cir.
1991)). See discussion supra Part III; notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
227 Heaps, 39 F.3d at 486. See supra note 61 and accompanying -text; discussion supra
Part III.
228 Heaps, 39 F.3d at 486.
229 Id.
230 As the court stated, "[t]he only evidence as to what was done with the money
after it was sent was that it was put in a box in a drawer of the defendant's house, be-
havior far more innocuous than even that considered by the Seventh Circuit in Jackson."
Id. at 486.
231 Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 1991)). See
discussion supra Part V.A.
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mote the carrying on of the unlawful activity by using the money
acquired to that end again.
Thus, this recent decision upholds the Jackson rationale as the
controlling determination of what type of conduct "promotes the
carrying on of specified unlawful activity." By inference, the Heaps
court found the "completion" argument unpersuasive in light of
both the specific facts of the case and congressional intent. Per-
haps the Heaps court realized that Montoya, Paramo, Cavalier and
Piervinanzi essentially read out of the statute the additional criteria
required under section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i): The defendant must not
only promote the activity, but intend to promote its carrying on
into the future. The Dimeck and Heaps courts upheld the congres-
sional intent of section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) which had been obscured
by previous decisions. Dimeck, Heaps, Jackson and Sanders return the
section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) inquiry to its intended scope. The use of
the fruits of illegal conduct does not, in itself, further promote-
the carrying on of that conduct. Rather, such conduct is part of
the original crime for which the defendant has been charged.3 2
To provide punishment in addition to other punishment rather
than instead of other punishment, promotion of future criminal
conduct must exist, rather than the simple attainment of the fruits
of 'past criminal conduct. The other circuits which have yet to
address this issue should focus on each element required by sec-
tion 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) and apply the statute accordingly.
Yet, ongoing confusion and varying applications of the Jackson
and Montoya rationales are evident in a recent ruling by the Third
Circuit in United States v. Conley.211 Judge Mansmann, writing for
232 See United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1223 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct 1076 (1994) (Rosenn, J., dissenting). In the dissenting opinion, Judge Rosenn criti-
cized the majority opinion, because the defendant did not plow back the proceeds into
purchases to promote the mail fraud scheme and thus did not engage in money launder-
ing. See also discussion supra Part VI.B.
233 37 F.3d 970 (3d Cir. 1994). In the Third Circuit's prior case, United States v.
Paramo, the appellate panel consisted of Judges Cowen, Roth and Rosenn (dissenting). In
Paramo, Judge Rosenn disagreed that the defendant engaged in money laundering under
§ 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). Again, in Judge Rosenn's view, the defendant did not "plow back the
proceeds into purchases to promote the mail fraud scheme." Citing Jackson, the judge
emphasized that "one can only contribute to the growth of a venture that is ongoing or
to be conducted in the future: It does not logically follow that one can promote an
enterprise that has already terminated." Additionally, the dissent argued that "simply en-
joying the fruits of illegal conduct does not further promote that conduct; rather, that is
part of the original crime for which the defendant has typically already received punish-
ment." Finally, "to justify additional punishment, there must be promotion of future crim-
inal conduct, rather than attainment of the fruits of past criminal conduct." United States
1995]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the panel in Conley, reinstated a money laundering conspiracy
charge dismissed by the trial court.234 The defendant was en-
gaged in an illegal gambling business via video poker machines.
The indictment alleged that Conley collected the proceeds of this
business and deposited them into his bank account to purchase
more machines and pay his employees.235 The district court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the money laundering
conspiracy charge since "double jeopardy constraints prevented a
defendant from being charged with both substantive illegal gam-
bling offenses and substantive money laundering offenses.""5 The
Third Circuit characterized the district court's holding as errone-
ous and held that the defendant's activities supported a conviction
under section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), even if the conviction is based on
the income from illegal gambling, without an additional specified
unlawful activity.2"7 The defendant "promoted" his illegal gam-
bling business by collecting the proceeds and using them for sub-
sequent financial transactions.3 "
In support, the Conley court reviewed the Paramo holding and
acknowledged as undisputed that "the underlying offense and
specified unlawful activity were legally completed prior to the
financial transaction comprising money laundering." 9 The court
further explained that Paramo provided a broad interpretation of
the "intent to promote" requirement, holding that a defendant
can be convicted for engaging in financial transactions "that pro-
mote not only ongoing but future unlawful activity, but also prior
unlawful activity."24 Yet, the Conley decision also acknowledged,
through its statement that "Congress did not enact money launder-
v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1223-24 (3d Cir. 1993) (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
234 Conley, 37 F.3d at 971.
235 Id. at 972-73.
236 United States v. Conley, 833 F. Supp. 1121, 1158 (W.D. Pa. 1993). The district
court reviewed the defendant's double jeopardy challenges and concluded that a violation
of the illegal gambling prohibition is a lesser included offense of money laundering.
237 Id. at 978. The court concluded that the elements for a money laundering con-
spiracy and a substantive illegal gambling offense are different. The conspiracy charge
requires a financial transaction conducted with the proceeds of specified unlawful activity
and committed with the intent to promote the specified unlawful activity. The gambling
charge does not proscribe such an intent requirement. The money laundering activity
and the illegal gambling activity do not constitute the same offense. Rather, the illegal
gambling constituted a "specified unlawful activity" for purposes of the money laundering
statute.
238 Id. at 979.
239 Id. at 980.
240 Id. at 978 n.11.
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ing statutes simply to add to the penalties for various crimes in
which defendants make money," that section 1956(a)(1) does not
proscribe all financial dealings conducted with the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity. The section only prohibits those finan-
cial transactions conducted with the intent to promote certain
"further illegal activity, under subsection (A)... "241 Conley fol-
lowed Jackson, requiring the intent element to relate to "the ad-
vancing or furthering of the illegal gambling business."242
Thus, it would follow that if Conley only collected the pro-
ceeds of the video poker machines, he could be indicted for con-
ducting an illegal gambling business, but not for laundering mon-
ey. How then can the court deem Paramo consistent with the Jack-
son rationale, since in Paramo, the defendant's financial transaction
was merely the act of an intermediary placing checks in the mail
to complete or carry out the underlying embezzlement of IRS
checks through the mail? In Paramo as in Montoya, there was no
"plowing back" of the proceeds by the defendant. Conversely,
despite the Conley court's assertion of consistency with Paramo, the
fact remains that the Coney decision reinstated the money launder-
ing portion of the conspiracy indictment because the indictment
charged that Conley "used illegal gambling proceeds to purchase
more video poker machines," "to pay employees" involved in the
vending enterprise, and to make payments to another business en-
tity that would "service the poker machines."243 The Conley court
correctly applied an analysis of the carrying on element of section
1956(a) (1)(A)(i) by noting that the indictment included financial
transactions that involved the use of proceeds "plowed back" to
promote the further ongoing activity of the underlying gambling
business.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the legislative history of section 1956(a)(1) reveals, Con-
gress perceived the enactment of the Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986 as "imperative if our law enforcement agencies are to
be effective against the organized criminal groups which reap
profits from unlawful activity by camouflaging the proceeds
through elaborate money laundering 'schemes." 2" Viewed as
241 Id. at 979 (emphasis added).
242 Id.
243 Id. at 979 n.12.
244 S. REP. No. 433, supra note 3, at 9.
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such, the money laundering statutes are powerful weapons with
which to combat the "lifeblood of the drug trade and other crimi-
nal organizations."245 Yet to effectively and fairly participate in
the war on crime, these tools must be applied consistently in the
federal courts. As one congressional sponsor stated, "We cannot
afford to waste any time. We need this weapon against drug traf-
fickers and organized criminals, and we need it now." "
It remains for the Supreme Court to address section
1956(a) (1)(A)(i) and establish a definitive interpretation in order
to bring a unified application of this section to the federal trial
and appellate courts. There are two primary reasons for the Su-
preme Court to entertain a review of a section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)
conviction. First, there is a need to establish an interpretation of
section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) 2"7 consistent with the plain language
employed by Congress when it sought to proscribe the carrying on
of specified unlawful activity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
should resolve the conflict between the federal circuit courts in
favor of the Jackson rationale adopted by the Seventh Circuit248
and followed by the Fourth249 and Tenth Circuits." ° Second, a
definitive ruling will correct the anomaly of convictions for pro-
moting the carrying out or completion of the underlying unlawful
activity currently occurring in the Second," Third, 2 Fifth,25
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal,25" which follow the Montoya
rationale first applied by the Ninth Circuit.
Again, these latter circuit courts have misinterpreted the plain
language of section 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) in seeking to apply a broader
proscription than Congress sought to establish. While this broad
245 Id. at 4.
246 Id. (Senator Joseph Biden).
247 See supra notes 14 & 32.
248 See discussion supra Part V.A.
249 See United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479 (4th Cir. 1994); discussion supra Part VI
and notes 208-30.
250 See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 845
(1991); discussion supra Part V.A and notes 143-45. See also United States v. Dimeck, 24
F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 1994); discussion supra Part VI; notes 201-207.
251 See United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 259
(1994); discussion supra Part V.B; notes 184-96 and accompanying text.
252 See United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1076 (1994); discussion supra Part V.B; notes 157-71 and accompanying text.
253 See United States v. Cavalier, 17 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1994); discussion supra Part
V.B; notes 172-83 and accompanying text.
254 See United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1991); discussion supra Part
V.B; notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
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reach may further serve the ultimate legislative goal of thwarting
crime through its pocketbook, it does so without legislative sup-
port. Equally important, Montoya and its progeny undermine con-
stitutional precepts. Former Senator Montoya's money laundering
conviction would not have been upheld by the Fourth, Seventh, or
Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal. Consistency and uniformity are
the underpinnings of the constitutional framework supporting
federal criminal prosecutions.
The completion of prior related specified unlawful activity
simply should not give rise to a money laundering charge under
section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). Rather, it is proof of an intent to pro-
mote the carrying on of subsequent unlawful activity, i.e., the plow-
ing back of the proceeds through a financial transaction, which
constitutes the statutory violation.
Maura E. Fenninghart
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